

EXHIBIT NO. 1

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1 AND
DECEMBER 8, 1941

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
July 2, 1941
Purple (CA) (K9)
Circular #1390 (Part 1 of 2.)

(National Secret.)

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd "The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part "The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution.

The Policy.

1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection.

Army 20701

Secret Trans. 8/8/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
To: Washington
July 2, 1941
Purple (CA) (K9)
Circular #1390 (Part 2 of 2.)

The Principal Points.

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand

shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed.

Addresses to which this message is sent: U. S., Germany and Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy.

Army 20702

Trans. 8/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Canton
 To: Tokyo
 July 14, 1941.
 Purple
 #255.

To be kept secret within the Department.

Re my #253^a.

Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratley Islands, Parao, Thaise Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks,

and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.

Army 19731

Trans. 7-19-41 (5)

• Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

19 July 1941

(Purple)

#669

(Abstract)

The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact.

Relayed to Rome, Nanking.

19842

JD-1: 3838

(A) Navy Trans. 7-21-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

21 July 1941

(Purple—CA)

#545

At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washington tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come to his office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull.

After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the Japanese-U. S. conversations, were identical to those towards which the Secretary was striving.

According to information received from various sources in various areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peaceful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations.

Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an "encirclement" of Japan. This expression is identical to that employed earlier by Germany, he pointed out.

As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United

States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two countries that she has been continuing the talks.

He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U. S. conversations which are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace on the Pacific.

That is the American viewpoint, he said, but would appreciate being advised of the Japanese viewpoint.

Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed at improving U. S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U. S. Embassy in Japan? To this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report was an accurate one.

Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained in the report referred to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction, what effect would that have on the U. S.-Japanese discussions which were being conducted?

Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he continued, he had been lead to understand that the new Foreign Minister of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in view of the fact that very little time has elapsed since the new Cabinet was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions.

Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the Ambassador in detail, and withdrew.

20026

JD-1:3937

(D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

23 July 1941

(Purple—CA)

#397

Regarding your message #545*.

1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message #368**, our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China.

It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S.

Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of ----- for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368 ** and 396 ***, and make an effort to improve the situation.

3. With regard to your message #536**** ----- (last 13 groups garbled).

*JD-1: 3937. Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.

**JD-1: 3680 (S. I. S. #19501). Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France or establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.

***JD-1: 3953 (S. I. S. #20029).

****JD-1: 3974 (S. I. S. #20087).

20091

JD-1: 3986

(D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

23 July 1941

(Purple—CA)

#555 (In 2 parts, complete).

Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as reported in my message #545*, I called on Welles myself this afternoon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to national suicide.

After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according to press report the French Indo-China affair was apparently being carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further developments for a little while yet.

I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the general public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into effect at a time such as this.

The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as anxious to bring the U. S.-Japanese "Understanding Pact" to a successful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet.

To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate his statements to Wakasugi. He would not, he said, reconcile the Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and myself. Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of attacking French Indo-China, he said. The concensus here is, he said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler and that Japan intends to use French Indo-China as a base from which to make further southward moves.

The U. S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by Japan's policies.

Although he did not mention what steps the United States is planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart, that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters with me.

In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing repairs. He asserted that no particular nation was suffering discriminatory action.

(Time at present: 2130).

*JD-1: 3937 (S. I. S. 20026). Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Jap Minister Wakasugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F.I-C. would violate the basis of proposed understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of Welles information and is told that "it is accurate".

20186

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
July 24, 1941
Purple (CA)
#406

Secret outside the Department.

Re my #397^a.

That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time display a high degree of statemanship is what I am secretly hoping for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Government would do likewise and would like to reciprocate. However, according to information received by us lately, especially according to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United States freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petroleum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would lead to a breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations and we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the development of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents of the caption telegram, request the United States Government to favorably treat this question.

Army 20034

Trans. 7/25/41 (5)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Net
July 26, 1941
Red
Circular #1616

Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the United States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England and the United States of all their interests in China. If and when things come to the worst, I want all areas concerned to cooperate in either destroying or seizing the considerable mining and other industrial equipment and ships of these countries. Be particularly sure to let nothing be taken away. I want you all to be ready at any moment to take this precautionary step of transferring the property of these two nations to our control.

Army 20144

Trans. 7-28-41 (5)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 July 1941
(Purple)
Circular #1622)

In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps while in China proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical purposes. (All transactions involving Britain and America will be placed on a license basis). At the same time, the Chinese will receive instructions to put similar measures in effect.

With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these regulations.

Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take.

This message addressed to London and Washington.

20267

JD-1:4111

(D) Navv Trans. 7-29-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

July 30, 1941

Purple

#609 Re my #608^a.

Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that they are going to take some drastic steps.

During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second time, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune moment.

Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest possible moment.

^a See S. I. S. #20331 (J. D.-1: 4149); Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bombing immediately.

Army 20423

Trans. 8/2/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA) K9

#433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1390^a. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

^a Not available.

Army 20461

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
 To: Washington
 July 31, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Army 20462

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
 To: Washington
 July 31, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not

Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

Army 20463

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

Army 20464

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

5 August 1941.

(Purple) (CA)

#447 (In 2 parts, complete).

1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-U. S. relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics.

According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes towards Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion.

On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily increased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried a dispatch from ——— on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those

exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.

Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety.

2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics.

If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved U. S.-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above.

3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-U. S. relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.

If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration.

For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure, all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance.

4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448*, to improve Japanese-U. S. relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration.

Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter.

5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-U. S. negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448* without delay.

*JD-1: 4326.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

7 August, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#452

Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely interested in the betterment of Japanese-U. S. relations. Through misunderstandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of our above described desires, Japanese-U. S. relations are, today, critically tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer be pursued.

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.

2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please sound out their attitude on this proposal.

3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the contents of your message #649* this possibility cannot be discounted entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the north, put up the following arguments:

(a) That we recognize the exceedingly criticalness of the situation and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break all precedent to represent his country himself.

(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people.

4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the sooner that such a meeting took place, the better.

The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrangements should be made so that the discussions between them will last no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States will consist of the minimum number of persons.

5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the discussions are definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary of State. As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President

has no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement on those points as well.

For the purpose of security, we are not advising the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for your information.

*JD-1: 4345 S. I. S. #20649. Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Jap-U. S. relations with a U. S. cabinet member (identity not given); suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of territories adjacent to F. I. C. to facilitate supplies of materials.

20699

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-8-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

7 August 1941

(Purple—CA)

#663 (In 2 parts, complete).

U. S.-Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it was unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing other essential policies.

I now wish to describe the recent general outlook in the United States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but I do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one whose time in office has been as short as yours.

1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the impression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close cooperation with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United States says, is out of the question.

We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely by the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to beginning the unofficial discussions.

Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the occupation of French Indo-China took place. The United States, refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupation, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. Moreover, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United States. I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in their relations with their Cabinet colleagues.

2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward expansion attempts.

When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt whatsoever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation.

With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered that the United States has suddenly established very close relations with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we should make any moves to the north.

It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and navy officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.

3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to ease U. S. public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future.

I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.

21045

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 8-15-41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

9 August 1941

(Purple)

#674 (In 2 parts, complete).

Re your #465*

Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the President on that occasion.

As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China

indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th.

In view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much from the interview I plan to have with the President.

Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation.

Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they may be.

*JD-1: 4429. Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding).

20868

JD-1: 4465

(D) Navy Trans. 8-12-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

15 August 1941

(Purple)

#739 (Separate message)

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and

that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.

21175

JD-1: 4637

(F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

15 August 1941

(Purple)

#740

On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739*. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.

*JD-1: 4637 S. I. S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U. S. munitions to Vladivostok.

21219

JD-1: 4656

(F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

August 16, 1941

Purple (CA)

#703 (Part 1 of 4)

Re your #480^a.

(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.

^a Not available.

Army 21150

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

August 16, 1941

Purple (CA)

#703 (Part 2 of 4)

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.

Army 21151

Trans. 8/19/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

August 16, 1941

Purple (CA)

#703 (Part 3 of 4)

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal.

I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary for the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was an exceptional thing.

Army 21152

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 August 16, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #703 (Part 4 of 4)

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is done now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the political standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the President will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the points I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire them at once.

Army 21153

Trans. 8/19/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 20, 1941
 Purple CA
 #487 (Part 1 of 2)

Re the last part of your #705^a.

We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo-German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime disintegrates, Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political confusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the necessity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense

and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia is adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo. Furthermore, since, due to the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow the establishment of _____ and military bases in the Maritime province of Siberia or in Kamchataka, and consequently of the security of both Japan and Manchukuo being threatened, we need to prevent such a thing from happening.

The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese forces in Manchukuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solution of various matters having to do with this area. I understand that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Manchukuo. This is solely for your information.

Army 21234

Trans. 8/19/41 (S)

• S. I. S. #21165. NOMURA asks to be informed for his own information what the Japanese government intends to do with regard to her northern policy.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 20, 1941
Purple (CA)
#487 (Part 2 of 2)

If _____ the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.

Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.

If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations—a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.

Army 21235

Trans. 8/20/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 23 August 1941
 (Purple)
 #497

From Financial Attache Nishiyama (#70).

1. American inspection of Japanese firms and banks comes closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. Furthermore the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out the Dairen office. According to Curtis's explanation the above move is dictated by economic policy as was the case in the Osaka amalgamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or three young Americans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others will be returned home.

2. A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the bank's accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued not to ratify such an agreement.

(This item is for your information only).

21644

JD-1: 4860

(H) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 August 26, 1941
 Purple CA (Very Urgent)
 #504

Re my #503.

That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.

Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.

Army 21481

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
August 26, 1941
Purple
#505

Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostock has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.

This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general view point of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.

In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.

Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.

Army 21482

Trans. 8/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
29 August 1941
(Purple—CA)
#756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4)

Regarding my #732 (?)*

The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.

(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to

hold preliminary conversations for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification"). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**).

(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without considering the question of China, which is vital to her.

(C) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U. S. S. R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.

(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However, when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this end.

Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.

(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".

(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.

(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to———.

(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.

(Part 4 not yet available).

*#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".

**JD-1: 4642 (S. I. S. #21150 to 53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U. S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.

***JD-1: 3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

21732

JD-1:

(A) Navy Trans. 9-3-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
September 2, 1941
Purple
#902

Re the first part of Circular #261^a from Ambassador HONDA.

1. Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exercised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their demand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated *East India Daily News* Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language magazine *Sinarusuratan*. However, on the other hand, in order that we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese with more and more determination.

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I deliberately took the occasion to exchange arguments on the Sino-Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO^b, who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below for your information.

(a) "I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I personally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI-SHEK. This is my firm belief.

(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Government recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not

recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Netherlands Government entertains the same convictions.

(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on these islands are not swept off their feet.

(d) "At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be convinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chinese residents here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well as other things.

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main objective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japanese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of that group here.

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China and to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in your good judgment, might be usable.

Army 21816

Trans. 9/4/41 (7)

* Not available.
* ROFINCK.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 3 September 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #524

Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.

In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.

The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval).

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.

21792

JD-1:4923

(D) Navy Trans. 9-5-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 September 4, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #528 (Part 1 of 2.)

Re your #556^a.

1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese-American relations. However, if we continue to argue merely the legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore, regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Government on July 24th and (August ?) 17th, we have already expressed our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since

we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to express first of all our viewpoint given in #529^b, and, after finding out on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and principally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you our text as soon as it is ready,) and thus help create a more wholesome atmosphere between the two countries.

Army 21790

Trans. 9/4/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b See S. I. S. #21786, #21787 and 21788.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
September 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#528 (Part 2 of 2.)

And so at 4:30 P. M. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.

2. The points in the separate telegram which require special explanation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to the discretion of the conferees.)

(1) We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government.

(2) As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.

(a) Explain the fact that if the—of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.

(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo-China.

(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.

(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.

Army 21791

Trans. 9/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

15 September 1941

(Purple)

#819 (In 3 parts, complete).

Re your 561 to 563*.

Points that have occurred to us here:

(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one".

(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.

(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.

(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no "leaders' conference".

(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U. S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.

(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.

22427

JD-1:

(FD) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (1)

*#561—JD-1: 5159. (S. I. S. #22247)

#562—JD-1: 5160. (S. I. S. #22248)

#563—JD-1: 5161. (S. I. S. #22249)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

17 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3)^a

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date." When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerable attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.

It is my opinion that the U. S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in that proposal were followed.

Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.

*JD-1: 3986 (S. I. S. #20091)—(You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U. S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

^a For Part 3; see S. I. S. #22477.

22506

JD-1: 5301

Navy trans. 9-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)

17 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#823 (Part 3 of 3)^a

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points—particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.

Nishiyama (Financial Attaché) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.

• Parts 1 & 2 not available.

22477

JD-1: 5301

Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 1 of 4)

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected, has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring, provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated \$-0,000,000 worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Britons' will to fight.

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about submarines.

Army 23011

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 2 of 4)

With regard to the question of the policy toward-----, the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy

toward There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the *New York Times*, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL's categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference with the President.

Army 23012

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 3 of 4)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. The people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government's foreign policy.

Army 23013

Trans. 10/3/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 22, 1941

J-19

#839 (Part 4 of 4)

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy is being kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian downfall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case

there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.

As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON,^a and I think he hit the nail on the head.

^a Kana spelling.

Army 23014

Trans. 10/3/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 September, 1941

(Purple—CA)

#842 (3 Parts—complete)

On the morning of the 23rd. I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***.

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U. S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589****. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity.

Part 2.

In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government has faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact

and the improvement of U. S.-Japanese relations can be made to parallel each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen the peace of the Pacific.

Part 3.

Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make him say anything definite.

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U. S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U. S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of the statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the "Leaders' Conference" takes place.

With this, our meeting was brought to an end.

*JD-1: 5160 (S. I. S. #22248)—Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U. S. negotiations.

**JD-1: 5162 (S. I. S. #22250)—"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door & commerce in China.)

***JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51)—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

****JD-1: 5359 (S. I. S. #22547-49)—Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U. S. questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U. S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the 1st anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the 28th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions.

22749

JD-1:

Navy trans. 9-26-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

September 26, 1941

Purple (CA)

#597

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but, as I told you in my #554^a, this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or tittle on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:

1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590^b?

1. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand

while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo-China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see your #752^c), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably did. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is all ready late, because of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595^d of today, so will you please communicate it to them.

^a See S. I. S. #22191 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If, however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addressees.

^b See S. I. S. #22550-51 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

^c See S. I. S. #21651 and #21615 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President.

^d See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Army 22753

Trans. 9/26/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#604

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605*. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U. S. Ambassador, too.)

*JD-1: 5503.

22863

JD-1: 5502

(D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#605 (In 4 parts, complete)

(Translator's note. This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew—see Tokyo to Washington #604*—and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.)

(Part 1)

1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet, broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.

If, at this time, Japanese-U. S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.

2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U. S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.

(Part 2)

3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace on the Pacific, and, indeed, for the world.

4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U. S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed this fact out previously but in view of the general tone of U. S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.

(Part 3)

5. Japanese-U. S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries. However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U. S.-Japanese relations that this would have.

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference". Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting does not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that there may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.

6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have moreover already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time.

7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.

(Part 4)

8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.

9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability

and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye's character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly, and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.

*JD-1: 5502.

JD-1:
22864

(D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
27 September 1941
(Purple—CA)
#865 (In 10 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591* and 595**. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595**. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.

1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are now committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.

(Part 2)

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.

(Part 3)

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she expresses in the U. S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of

practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I, therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.

2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.

(Part 4)

3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U. S. vessel) have further stiffened the U. S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U. S. agreement to this point.

(Part 5)

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U. S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have had ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term "right to self defense" as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message #381****). For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.

(Part 6)

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540***, the United States has, fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the "annex." Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.

(Part 7)

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase.

The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only. We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.

(Part 8)

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially close relations".

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China Incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret).

-----with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices ----- and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April.

(Part 9)

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China". I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence.

(Part 10)

5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U. S. proposal of 21 June.

6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U. S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace on the Pacific.

In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference.

*JD-1: 5415 (S. I. S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.

**JD-1: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".

***JD-1: 3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

****Not available.

22961

JD-1: 5534

(D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

September 28, 1941

Purple (CA)

#606 (Part 1 of 2)

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.

Army 22819

Trans. 9/29/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

September 28, 1941

Purple (CA)

#606 (Part 2 of 2)

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it

seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once).

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.

Army 22820

Trans. 9/29/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
29 September 1941
(Purple) (CA)
#867

During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday), I called on the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your messages from 604 to 606*, I asked that I be granted a secret interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U. S. Government within the next couple of days. He added that he read Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being thoroughly familiar with the situation.

Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughly unified in favor of it.

I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them. There are those, for example, who cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the American continents. Japanese public opinion cannot be made to conform with the every whim of the United States. To await its doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to bloom, I said.

23033

JD-1: 5592

(D) Navy Trans. 10-3-41 (7)

*604-JD-1: 5502 (S. I. S. #22863). Toyoda-Grew talk held 1630 Sept. 27. Japs again strongly urge early action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further postponement.

*605-JD-1: 5503 (S. I. S. #22864). Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew.

*606-JD-1: 5504 (S. I. S. #22819-20). Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of his talk with Grew.

[Secret]

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
29 September 1941
(Purple)
#870 (In 4 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti.

I realize, of course, that I am being presumptuous, but the following are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U. S.-Japanese relations:

(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866*, we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunderstandings through transmission errors and through differences in translations. This is particularly true of some vague passage which cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our message #865**, and others for points which are in doubt). Under these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore, would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U. S. attitude.

(Part 2)

(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes confusion and further delays.

As a matter of fact DESUBĀNIN *** told us in confidence that the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it.

(Part 3)

(3) Father Druht advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo (probably Walsh) reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must be due to interference from some Washington source, Walsh cables.

For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various reports on the subject, that it is exceedingly unlikely that the United States has any intention of backing down from those established stands.

We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much "wishful thinking".

(Part 4)

(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we are overly anxious.

On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order on us, effecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence they are in no rush.

Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves.

23110

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (1)

*JD-1: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

**JD-1: 5534 (S. I. S. #22961). Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U. S.-Jap negotiations.

***R. E. Desvernine, President American Crucible Steel Co.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

September 30, 1941

Purple (CA)

#614 (Part 1 of 3.)

Re your #865^a.

1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should avoid presenting them with various written suggestions. I am entirely in agreement with you.

2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595^b and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis thereof.

3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message are as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:

1. The reason why I left out the expression, "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the

minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.

Army 22870

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 September 30, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #614 (Part 2 of 3)

2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both Governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.

3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.

4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.

a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.

b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.

c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles laid down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.

d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.

Army 22871

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 September 30, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #614 (Part 3 of 3.)

e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.

5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my #595^a coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.

6. *a.* Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.

b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.

If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without any delay, wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.

Army 22872

Trans. 9/30/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

[Secret]

From: Rome

To: Tokyo

September 30, 1941

Purple

#627

Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people. I mean to say:

1. The Propaganda Department told the press to confine itself to a mere mention of the present anniversary and to turn its attention mainly to other things, refraining from discussion of the bearing of this alliance upon the present international situation.

2. The ceremonies attendant upon this anniversary were carried out half-heartedly or even less by the Italians. It would even seem that this was done to spite Japan and Germany. At Villa Madama there was a reception held for CIANO, but certainly no festivities worth mentioning took place. At a reception held for the press, at first the German and Italian flags only were hanging in the hall. A Japanese reporter mentioned this, and then they pulled them all down.

3. When asked about felicitations and ceremonies, the Propaganda Department always replied that this was not a good time to be ostentatious.

Furthermore, the other day PRUNAS told ANDŌ that word had been received from Ambassador INDELLI that when he inquired of the Japanese Foreign Office officials concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States, they were very reserved and uncommunicative, showing that their erstwhile fervor for the Axis was not as glowing as in days gone by.

All this shows how dissatisfied the Italian people are. All I can say is that the exercises held in Tokyo on the ——— and the Minister's speech, together with the messages from the Premier and Minister, saved the situation perhaps to some extent.

Army 22946

Trans. 10/2/41 (G)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

September 30, 1941

Purple (CA)

#881 Part 1 of 2^a

Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the two countries might be dangerous.

While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, the Admiral stated that the United States does not intend to go ahead and strike at Japan, adding that if the United States fights a two ocean war after all she will have to defend herself in the Pacific.

Army 22987

Trans. 10/2/41 (2)

^a Part 2 not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

1 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#618 (In 5 parts, complete)

(Part 1)

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki.

Re your #870*

1. Please refer to our message #613** with regard to the matter contained in your #866***.

2. I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you complain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on the table; we continue to send you note after note, etc. Our note of 4 September was so designed to contain our views of the three subjects

which have been discussed hitherto in a very broad light. It was not drawn up with any intention of "slowing down" the procedure in the sense voiced by Hull. We were of the opinion that there were some points of the preliminary talks which needed clearing up. Thinking that it would facilitate matters if we drew up our proposals in the form that the U. S. proposal of 21 June was put in (my message #595****). We further sent you message #590*****, dealing with Japanese-Chinese peace terms and my message #591***** pertaining to the garrisoning of troops, in the hope that they would supplement and explain our note of 4 September. They were forwarded to your office by the Foreign Minister, as reference material to be used by the Ambassador in explaining our position to the United States. They were sent at the request of the Premier and the military.

(Part 2)

Putting it bluntly, we were quite unaware of the fact that the Ambassador in the United States had allegedly submitted, for the purpose of further consideration by this office, certain changes in our note of 4 September, (the 1st, 4th—including the supplements—, 6th and 7th paragraphs were unchanged; paragraph 2 was unchanged with the exception of that part referring to the exchanging of official notes; paragraph 3 was identical to the Japanese note of 15 June; and to paragraph 5 was added the words: "For the production and procurement of national resources" to the U. S. proposal of 21 June), until we were questioned about it by the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo. This allegation came as a great surprise and the Foreign Minister replied that the note of 14 July must have been the one implied. The Minister added that if the Embassy in Tokyo was in immediate need of the English text of that message, he could no doubt obtain it from the State Department, and that we could supply him with the Japanese text immediately.

It was then that that part which appears in parentheses in the preceding paragraph came to light. At the same time, the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had said that the "draft was not official" to the State Department was also brought to light.

(Part 3)

These conditions have further complicated the already exceedingly complicated negotiations and for that reason, it is indeed very regrettable.

3. It is regrettable that in spite of the fact the Ambassador in Washington and yourself are putting forth your best efforts and in spite of the fact that we are facing the problems with the utmost sincerity, the United States does not reciprocate our statesmanship. However, there are none here who are underrating the United States or who are looking upon the developments with undue optimism.

4. We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all those officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incident subsequent to the 27th*****. The utmost caution shall have to be exercised

in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan. This is, of course, for your and the Ambassador's information only.

Your explanation to the United States should be made along the following lines: "Apparently there are those in the United States who misunderstand the political situation in Japan. These persons seem to be of the opinion that the Konoye cabinet's position is not strong. Therefore, any agreement entered into with that government is in danger of being disregarded by the military or some other strong organization. This is not a correct analysis of the situation in Japan. It is true that there are those who express opposition to the present cabinet but these elements can be easily overruled.

(Part 4)

"Of course there have been public utterances such as Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Nakano's speech, who expressed, judging from the reports, opinions opposed to those contained in the Premier's message. Anyone, however, who knows the characteristics of the Japanese and who are familiar with conditions in Japan, should be able to understand the true meaning of those speeches. Mabuchi placed the most emphasis on encouraging the people while Nakano, pursuing his usual line, need not be looked upon with any importance.

"Unfortunately, however, foreign newsmen stationed in Japan, attached much importance to these speeches. British and American newspapers which place the most importance on 'journalistic interest' played up minor points in an exaggerated manner.

"These, of course, are causing misunderstandings. We are confident, however, that the people who have spent any time at all in Japan can see the true picture, etc."

We believe that if the situation were explained to them in that manner, they will more readily understand matters. Moreover, it is the truth.

Not only the Foreign Minister but all concerned are as one in this matter, and are willing to meet any without fear. You can readily see, in view of domestic circumstances and in view of external relations, that we are all eager to have the "leaders' conference" take place. This is but a natural development, and if they insist on construing it to be impatience on our part, I guess it can't be helped.

(Part 5)

That we intend Washington to be the central locale of these negotiations is as you stated in your recent message and should have been further clarified by the telephone communication between the Foreign Office and the Embassy. Because of some peculiar circumstances, the occasion may arise where some talks are conducted in Tokyo first. That would be done only under unavoidable circumstances. Any who believe that any idea of stalling was behind such a move, thoroughly misunderstands the Foreign Minister's motives.

Time is now the utmost important element. Whether this matter materializes or not has a direct and important bearing on peace on the Pacific and even of the world. The seriousness of the situation

must be thoroughly recognized. Please exercise every bit of power available to bring about a favorable conclusion of this matter.

Paragraph 2 of my message #614***** was meant to point out that we have no objections to using the contents of my message #595**** as a basis of negotiations if so desired by the United States.

Although there is that matter contained in my message #617***** , we make the above statement anew.

23078

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5614. Available, being translated.

**Available, not translated; dated 30 September.

***JD-1: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.

****JD-1: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".

*****JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51). Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

*****JD-1: 5415 (S. I. S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China, even after peace with Japan is restored.

*****First anniversary of the Tripartite Pact.

*****JD-1: 5510 (S. I. S. #22870-71-72). I agree that we should avoid any more written suggestions to the U. S. until they give us some reply.

*****JD-1: (Available, being translated.)

[Secret]

From: Berlin

To: Tokyo

1 October 1941

(Purple)

#1198

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider

it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.

Relayed to Rome.

23673

JD-1:

(H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 October 2, 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #625

Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the Cabinet undergo a revision. It seems that this rumor is going around in Washington, but in any case, it is absolutely false and untrue. The situation here in Japan as described in my #618^a should be known to you and, whenever necessary, will you please enlighten the Americans. Too, Secretary HULL appears to be gravely concerned over public opinion here in Japan. I think that he has questioned you twice on this subject. Well, let me tell you that public opinion is very calm here and we intend to take advantage of the situation. We are merely awaiting their memorandum, and the Government entertains the view that we had better issue a statement on these Japanese-American negotiations at the earliest opportunity. This opinion is growing.

Naturally the substance of this statement will be confined to our side. We can merely refer briefly to matters on the American side. In any case, we will discuss all this with the Americans.

It seems that there have been a number of rumors concerning a statement by the Government, lately. Among them there are many mistaken ones.

Army 22988

Trans. 10/2/41 (S)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 2, 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #889

At Secretary HULL's invitation, I called on him at nine o'clock this morning. He handed me the reply of the United States Government which I have given in the separate telegram #890^a and said that it is the opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a (complete ?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" understanding would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have to be made. I remarked that the Japanese Government will, no doubt, be very much disappointed in such a reply but that in any case I would transmit it.

Army 23001

Trans. 10/3/41 (7)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 3 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #627

I described the various problems involving the United States and Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September. (He had planned to leave from Nagasaki and make connections with the President Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October. However, in view of illness on the part of the Counselor who was to have acted as Charge d'Affaire in the Ambassador's absence, his trip has been apparently postponed for about three weeks).

At the same time, we asked Ambassador Grew to also speak to Ambassador Craigie and we understand that they also discussed matters on the same day.

Subsequently, according to absolutely unimpeachable sources, Ambassador Craigie cabled Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassador Halifax, explaining the importance of having the United States and Japan come to an immediate agreement to hold a conference. The gist of Craigie's opinions contained in those messages is being forwarded to you as my supplementary message #628*.

In view of the source, will Your Excellency keep the information contained strictly to yourself only.

23079

JD-1: 5623

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (W-TT)

*JD-1: 5624.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 3 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #628

1. With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matuoka the chances of turning away from the Axis policy and toward the Democracies, has been considerably enhanced.

2. Among the difficult points in the materialization of a Japanese-United States conference, is that with Japan speed is required. Moreover, she can enter into nothing more, at the present time, than a temporary understanding. On the other hand, by pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be countenanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner.

3. Prince Konoye is sincerely desirous of avoiding the dangers which Japan may face through her connections in the Tripartite Pact and in the Axis for which the Prince, himself, feels responsibility. Opposition within the country to the Prince's reversal of policy is fairly strong. Therefore, unless the Japanese-U. S. conversations are held in the very near future, the opportunity will probably be lost. Moreover, if by some chance, meetings fail to materialize, or if they are unduly delayed, the Konoye cabinet will be placed in a precarious position.

4. We realize, of course, that there are numerous very complicated matters involved in the proposed negotiations. However, both the U. S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.

In conclusion, it must be added that until Japan's reversal of policy is concretely proven—in other words, until the Konoye principles actually materialize—there should be no let up in the retaliatory economic measures by us.

(NOTE.—The above message expresses the views of British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, as explained in JD-1: 5623).

23080

JD-1: 5624

(D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo.
 3 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #894 (In 4 parts, complete)

Although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. talks have finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression

that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through.

The general public has been becoming more and more favorable to the President's foreign policy, until today it is being supported overwhelmingly. The program of war time industrial production has been making satisfactory progress, and it may be said that the general public is taking a more optimistic view of the European war. This last is due to the surprisingly good showing the Soviet Union has been making in her war efforts. The United States is well satisfied with that.

At the same time, however, both the United States and Great Britain are fearful lest the Soviet Union enter into an independent peace. The United States and Britain are giving determined aid to the Soviet Union in order to prevent such a peace from materializing, and, if possible, to enable the Russians to hold out over the winter and resume fighting next spring. The Atlantic war has shown a definite turn in favor of Britain; submarine losses have increased and hence, loss to shipping has dropped radically. Due to the vastly strengthened air arm of the British and because of her power on the seas, England herself is practically safe from invasion.

(Part 2)

That all is not perfect for Germany in the war on her eastern front may be seen from the fact that the various Balkan countries show some hesitancy. At the same time unrest is on the increase in the various occupied areas and Italy's war strength is constantly on the decrease. Apparently it is only through German intervention and pressure that Italy is prevented from entering into a separate peace. The effectiveness of the blockade will increase as the war is prolonged, and the same situation as existed in the last war will probably be brought about.

Such are the optimistic predictions being made here with regard to the final outcome of the war.

Should Germany succeed in bringing about an independent peace with the Soviet Union at this time, Germany would be able to amply reinforce her forces directed toward England. This would place England in a critical position once again and this is probably the one thing the United States does not want. (Translator's note: From this point to end of Part 2 badly garbled; guess work contained in translation). For such a development will probably involve the United States very deeply in the Atlantic war and it is possible that the United States would lose ships because of it. If such a situation materializes, the United States would for the first time realize the imminence of the war to herself and may then—but not until then—take a slightly more conciliatory attitude toward Japan.

From the Japanese point of view, it would be most favorable if the Soviet Union does sue for an independent peace and if, as a result, the Germans launch a new phase of the war on the Atlantic, such developments would undoubtedly have the most favorable effects on U. S.-Japanese relations.

(Part 3)

It is true that the Konoye message relieved to a certain extent the very critical situation between the United States and Japan for it had a tendency to squelch those few in the United States who advocate going to war against Japan first. This sentiment has been kept smothered since then and at the same time the message did, indirectly, tend to get the United States to become further involved in the Atlantic.

On the other hand, however, the United States has not decreased her economic pressure against Japan one iota. It should be carefully noted that the United States is proceeding along a policy of making this her threatening power. Should the United States continue along her present economic policy, without resorting to the force of arms, she shall gain her objectives of a war against Japan without once resorting to a battle. Moreover, I am of the opinion that unless there is a radical change in the world situation or unless Japan changes her foreign policy, the United States will not alter this policy of hers against Japan.

(Part 4)

Of the three major topics involved in our negotiations, two have been agreed upon for all practical purposes. (Hull is an advocate of free trade and believes that "bloc" economics is the cause of wars. He is trying to force the British Empire to accept this philosophy at the present time). Thus the only remaining problem is that concerning the evacuating of our troops. In view, however, of the conditions you referred to in your message #622*, and upon taking into consideration the undoubted confusion in the future of the world, it will become apparent that a complete evacuation would be an impossibility. We do not believe that it will be an impossible task for us to come to some acceptable understanding with the United States at a later date.

In view of the fact that the "understanding" between the United States and Japan hinges on this one point, I would appreciate your giving this phase your further consideration.

Incidentally, in the course of a friendly discussion with a Cabinet official, he advised me that both the President and the Secretary of State are sincere in their desire to bring about an "understanding" between Japan and the United States and that the matter of the removal of the troops is the only thing that blocks the attainment of this goal.

In the opinion that the matter involved is of much importance, I submit my humble opinions concerning it to you.

23166

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-7-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5634 (S. I. S. #23073-75). Long 3 part summary of military-political-economic conditions with "free China".

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
 To: Washington
 October 4, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #637

Re your #890^a.

Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points:

1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these fundamentals, we have already exchanged our views and so they should be clear. Now that only those points which the United States Government has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, and the question of the Three-Power agreement), would it be all right for us to assume that the United States Government has a clear comprehension of the other points?

2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be differences of opinions when it comes to actually applying these four principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the presumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domestically. Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States Government has no misunderstanding of it.

Army 23118

Trans. 10/6/41 (X)

^a See S. I. S. #23101-#23109 inclusive and #23115-23116, inclusive. Text of American Government's statement to the Japanese Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 7 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #643 (In 3 parts, complete)

I requested the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and I forward it to you for your information only.

"I am in receipt of the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government. I would consider myself exceedingly fortunate if I were permitted to hear your opinions thereon", I said.

To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a resume of that memo from Washington, but that was all and for that reason he said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that since the resume undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through coop-

eration, in the same manner as is the Ambassador, not so much as a diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what are the views of the U. S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked him if he had not had some communication from his home government which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above mentioned resume.

The Ambassador said he had been cabled the resume only, and nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

I, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not completely satisfied with the U. S. note referred to at present.

(Part 2)

By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into consideration the domestic and external circumstances of Japan.

The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the matter.

2. According to the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully subscribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations with the U. S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. The record of the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that interview, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home government. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly records that we agreed in principle only. The copies of the U. S. memorandum which were sent to various persons concerned for their perusal and study were corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive in doing so, I said.

The U. S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him.

(Part 3)

Continuing, I said that though I had no intention of being too argumentative, there was one item I would like to question the Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in any manner.

After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speaking the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official note?

The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various papers in the State Department. He said that that was entirely an on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord "in principle".

3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall that when that matter was first brought up, Ambassador Nomura had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representative, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To attempt to do so now, though, I said, involves the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft" incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at present.

23349

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-11-41 (1)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873. Part 1 of 4.

Re my #708 ^a.

1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my aforementioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however, a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle. The fight between the Reich and the Soviet

Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.

Army 23221

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #20461-42 inclusive, giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873 Part 2 of 4

All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the China trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Army 23222

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873 Part 3 of 4

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA-STAHMER talks.) Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.

3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the

United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.

Army 23223

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

October 8, 1941

Purple (CA)

Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.

Relayed to Washington.

Army 23224

Trans. 10/8/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 1 of 4)^a

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Re your #637.^b

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on

which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

Army 23319

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

^a For Part 3 of 4, see S. I. S. #23293.

^b S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

Army 23320

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 3 of 4) ^a

(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters

in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

Army 23293

Trans. 10/10/41 (7)

* Parts 1 and 2 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 8, 1941

Purple

#907 (Part 4 of 4)

Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634^a, the American Ambassador talked like I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277^b), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applies them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

Army 23321

Trans. 10/10/41 (2)

^a The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of the message mentioned is unrelated.

^b S. I. S. #17168 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude for policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

[Secret]

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 9 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #915

Re your #637*

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc., could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon.)

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.

*JD-1: 5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the U. S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

23437

JD-1: 5805

(D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 9 October 1941
 (Purple)

#917 (In 2 parts, complete)

For official code handling.

Secret outside of department.

Re my #915*.

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637** and along the general lines of your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into minute explanations pointing out that the U. S. Government's attitude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances northward and southward, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, withdrawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there

is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic attitude of the U. S. Government which is indicated in the memorandum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study by the U. S. Government and that this represents all that the U. S. Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the U. S. Government does not now desire to enter upon any more discussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my questions.

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful consideration.

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed on the assumptions mentioned in my #907***.

23438

JD-1:

(F) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5805 (S. I. S. #23437).

**JD-1: 5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is agreement with the U. S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

***JD-1: 5740 (S. I. S. #23319). In reply to Tokyo query whether the U. S. agrees to all points except "evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U. S. position and reasons for refusing the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U. S. insist must be the basis of an understanding.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Washington

October 10, 1941.

Purple (CA)

#650

Re your #915^a.

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637^b and related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other.

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete minutes of what transpires.

Army 23384

Trans. 10-13-41 (X)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to clarify immediately with the U. S. Government two points.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 10, 1941

Purple (CA)

#923

I have read your #650^a.

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd.

I think that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917^a yesterday. However, I am sending you this for your information.

Army 23355

Trans. 10/11/41 (7)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Washington

October 12, 1941

Purple (CA)

54

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clear-cut proposal:

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd and have given it our most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult

for us to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non-discrimination in commerce in China.

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those three points, there is also a question of time. There is no use in exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties as exist may fade away automatically."

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted "Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it will be hard to say what the extremists may do."

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concerning French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect it soon.

Army 23517

Trans. 10/15/41 (X)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
13 October 1941
(Purple) (CA)
#658

Re my #657*

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U. S.-Japanese negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous messages referring to this subject, on the points listed below. (The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear this fact in mind).

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular disagreements other than the three points which are under consideration at the present time?

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our proposal of -- September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of -- September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States be reluctant to submit a clearcut counter proposal to ours referred to above, we should request that they submit a basicly new proposal immediately).

Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops.

23421

JD-1: 5779

(D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5778 (S. I. S. #23420). "We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised."

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
13 October 1941
(Purple—CA)
#662

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used.

U. S. attitude
Is reasonable

MARIKO
OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KURUYA
(Is Mariko coming to pay you a social call?)

U. S. attitude
Is unreasonable

MARIKO
ASOBI NI KO NU
(Mariko is not coming to pay a social call.)

General outlook of the negotiations

SONO GO NO KŌSI NO KENKŌ
(The health of the Minister since then.)

The Four Principles

SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE MONO
(Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck Gods.)

Will they stick to it?

KI NI IRIMASITA KA
(Did it meet with your approval?)

Is there some way through it?

KI NI IRIMASEN KA
(Did it not meet with your approval?)

23514

JD-1: 5840

(D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 13 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #663

Re my #658*

I pointed out in my message referred to in the heading that circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently.

23443

JD-1: 5815

(D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5779 (S. I. S. #23421).

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 13 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #939 (In 3 parts, complete)

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported in a subsequent cable*, but in the meantime, I shall submit this which concerns the two points on which you requested information in your message #658**. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the details of the tone, etc. of the talks.

In general, the tone of the talks were friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too.

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference, other than the three points. Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain them and then advise us.

(Part 2)

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in China, Wakasugi said that the U. S. attitude had been made clear in her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral statement of 2 October. We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Wakasugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or the Ambassador.

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceedingly difficult, from a practical standpoint, to suddenly evacuate them.

Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should well understand that.

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the details up to Japan and China to decide?

(Part 3)

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sincerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as to ways and means of carrying it out.

1. The United States has no intention of making any counter proposals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circumstances, be altered. The United States' objections to the Japanese proposals of — September and 25 September are based on the fact that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U. S. proposals—which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier Japanese proposals—referred to above.

23704

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (1)

*Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)

**JD-1: 5779 S. I. S. #23421. Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with Welles cover the entire subject of the U. S.-Jap negotiations, and in particular, just what the U. S. wants re evacuation or garrisoning of troops in China.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

13 October 1941

(Purple)

#941 (In 6 parts, Part 4 only available).

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous report.

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory degree. Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, an agreement on principle is without meaning.

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it

for individual agreements * * * (2 lines missed) * * * (Wakasugi pointed out that) our proposal of 6 September expressed a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people of Japan for a northward and/or southward military move, for the sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate.

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship?, Wakasugi asked.

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even after matters had progressed to the point of the United States submitting the 21 June proposal.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement of the Government of France.

23817

JD-1: 5967

(D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 14, 1941

(Purple)

#943 (Part 1 of 2)* (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

Army 23570

Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

* For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 14, 1941
 (Purple)
 #943 (Part 2 of 2)^a

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE^b told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE^c reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER^d reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

Army 23516

Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

- ^a Part 1 of 2 not available.
^b Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.
^c American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.
^d A Washington newspaper correspondent.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 15 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #667

Regarding your #939* and #941**.

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind:

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of your message #941**, it may give them an opening to insist on having the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement.

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipulations been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently.

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal any further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States intentions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, and reply results.

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it handled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled between you and the Secretary of State.

23706

JD-1: 5933

(A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

*JD-1: 5929 (S. I. S. #23704).

**Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 October 1941

(Purple)

#950

Chief of Office routing.

Regarding Your #667*.

Tomorrow afternoon (16th) Wakasugi is expected to confer with Welles. Yesterday (14th) "O" is said to have conferred with the President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For your information).

The Military Attache here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point.

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have repeatedly informed the other side of this.

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured that we do not intend to minimize the importance of this question nor to effect any compromise.

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for discussion once again.

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our Military Attache.

23708

JD-1: 5935

(A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (7)

*JD-1: 5933 (S. I. S. #23706).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate telegram #672^a and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

Army 23631

Trans. 10/17/41 (7)

^a See S. I. S. #23571—English text of a message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American Government.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (English Text)
#672

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration

but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

Army 23571

Trans. 10/16/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#959 (Part 1 of 2)

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said:

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a direct threat to Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany."

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinions of the cabinet, the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances."

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we are compromising.)

Army 23715

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#959 (Part 2 of 2)

RETRANSLATION

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present, when mutual doubts were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be called a question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a

question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the *Astoria*. I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material things. I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand in friendship to us a little, you could have our lasting amity; otherwise we may turn out to be permanent enemies.

Army 23716

Trans. 10/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#962. (Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p. m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked together.)

1. HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of Cabinet it is, however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded a Government that would take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the Under-Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 25th. That is why I came."

Army 23711

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple

#962. (Part 2 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

HULL spent half an hour recounting the substance of his conversations so far and then went on to say, "The United States is certainly not playing along with a policy of procrastination. I earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal political relations reestab-

lished between Japan and the United States. In Europe HITLER is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you Japanese also are attempting to set up a new regime in the Far East by force of arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot stand by and approve this course of events with equanimity. We stand for non-discrimination in trade and for freedom of the seas and are opposed to all of these militaristic policies. One of the hardest things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the fact that, while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries on a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now among the Japanese people and among influential people there that I doubt if it would be possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peaceful policy." WAKASUGI then said, "It is true that there are those who advocate expansion northward or southward; however, ever since we have been a naval power foreign nations have lined up our neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show how this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have done is to follow the trend necessary for the national security and existence of our people. As a measure for self preservation we had to get necessary materials. Do not think that we deliberately embarked on a military campaign with any joy.

Army 23712

Trans. 10-20-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 16, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#962 (Part 3 of 5)

"The United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish an understanding with Japan on these important questions, she must stop military moves northward and southward, but unless the United States ceases measuring everything by her own yardstick and understands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a friendly attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the situation will inevitably continue to grow worse."

3. WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of the three points he had made, and HULL repeated that the present object of the United States is to defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring about equality of treatment and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area, including China. He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loathe to go too deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China because he has always been an advocate of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other powers. He asked if there was not some Chinese with whom he (WAKASUGI) could discuss these matters directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both AMBASSADOR HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WEN, he was not able to discuss the relations of the two countries with them. HULL seemed to understand this and said that in any case this would have to be worked out between Japan and China.

Army 23713

Trans. 10/20/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#962 (Part 4 of 5)^a

WAKASUGI then went on to say that it would be very difficult for us to evacuate China. He told them it was very necessary to keep troops there. He went on to explain the activities of the Communist forces in the north as described in your messages and by the Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that we had to keep forces and to protect the lives, property, and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners. HULL then asked, "Well, if you did not take your troops away and left them there for a long time, how would the Chinese take it?" WAKASUGI said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the safety of their lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say, "So far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care in the hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational activities. However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists are trying to do is to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. All the Chinese fear this exceedingly." HULL, however, countered by saying, "In the past we, too, stationed some soldiers in Central America and left them there as long as ten years, but the results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we have found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy." He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further and seemed to think that this should be thrashed out between ourselves and the Chinese. WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other questions besides those three which you wish to discuss?" and HULL answered, "None in particular."

4. WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into the differences and points of agreement in the Japanese-American proposals. HULL immediately agreed. He was all in favor of having the officials concerned in this business convene and work out the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste their time in arguments without any results. He said that the time would not permit of such procrastination and that he would, for the time being, like to confine his discussions to important questions only and to discuss them with the Under Secretary alone.

Army 23714

Trans. 10/20/41 (2)

^a Part 5 not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #682

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

23677

JD-1:5923

(D) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 17 October 1941
 (Purple)
 #966 (In 6 parts, complete)

Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour and a half, from 4:30 p. m. on the 17th. The following is the gist of their talk:

1. Wakasugi stated that he would like to further discuss the three points involved in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations with the understanding that neither side commit itself to what is said here in view of the fact that we were not in receipt of instructions from the new cabinet as yet. Hull expressed his agreement to this proposal and then inquired what the outstanding points were in the respective proposals.

In reply, Wakasugi read those paragraphs pertaining to the right of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact as contained in our proposal of 25 September, and the U. S. proposal of 21 June. He went on to explain the features in accordance with the various instructions from Tokyo, pointing out that we had made the right of self-defense on which the U. S. placed much emphasis, a mutual right. Did that not satisfy the U. S. demands?, Wakasugi asked.

Hull replied that during the tenure of the former Foreign Minister it was loudly broadcast that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the United States from entering the war. Since the United States may be forced to enter the war for self-defense purposes, the United States could not help but have doubts as to Japan's true motives. The United States has no intention of taking military aggression against any nation; her only intention is to consider ways and means of defending herself, he explained repeatedly.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that fundamentally the thing called "right of self-defense" was put in motion in the direction it is intended to be used by the state which invokes its use. Therefore,

it is natural that depending on the intentions of another, we should restrain ourselves from fulfilling our duties under the terms of an agreement.

That is why we definitely established the fact in our proposal that our intentions are strictly self-preservation and that application of any phases thereof, would be absolutely on behalf of self-preservation. Self-preservation, as we have used the term, implies that Japan and Japan alone shall determine the means of carrying it out without depending on any foreign country whether it be Britain the United States or Germany, or any other. There are no other implications or interpretations to the phrases from our viewpoint.

Fundamentally, Wakasugi continued, wasn't it a self-evident fact that political agreements such as the Tripartite Pact cannot limit the signatories to any political commitments against a third country?

In the light of the Imperial Rescript published at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the spirit and the aims of said Pact should be evident. In the final analysis, that Pact's real mission is the contribution to world peace and does not support any intent of aggression and aggrandizement.

Hull listened carefully to Wakasugi's detailed explanations. Apparently the Secretary suspects that, basically, the nature of the Pact could be twisted at will to suit the needs of either a Japanese cabinet favoring military aggression or a cabinet favoring peace. Wakasugi, therefore, asked whether it was not true that unless suspicions were allayed, it would be impossible to come to agreements with any country. Was it not true, he continued, that when viewed through eyes of suspicion there would be much that could be questioned, even in the so-called defense measures of the United States?

In any event, it was agreed that both of the proposals in question shall be given careful study after which a reply would be submitted.

2. Hull places the most emphasis on matters pertaining to non-discrimination in trade. He urged that we listen carefully to Welles' explanation of how Japan would actually profit by such a system. Hull then went on to point out that materialization of the non-discrimination in trade matters has been his main objective since his assumption of post many years ago and described the progress he has made in various quarters. As an example, of the success of his program, he pointed to the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina. He seemed particularly proud of this accomplishment and added that even the self-interested British appeasement policy had been prevented in Central and South America. (What was meant exactly by this was not made clear).

Hull went on to say that if this policy were limited merely to the southwest Pacific area, it would not be of much value. Unless this principle is applied to the entire Pacific area (including China) the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible. There is more probability that world peace, under present world conditions, can be attained through adjustments in trade relations than through adjustments of political relations between nations, he claimed.

It cannot be doubted for a moment, he continued, that if Japan adopts this basic policy and applies it in the Far East, that she will have the advantage over all countries in her area because of her geographical position, her race, and because of her business acumen. He urged repeatedly that the concrete and positive advantages be pointed out to our government.

Will you please therefore, be thoroughly advised of this phase and let us know your opinions thereof.

Wakasugi then said that he would admit that the various principles set forth by the United States were indeed fine and as guiding principles no one could possibly find fault with them. The cold facts are, however, that different means have to be used by each individual nation in order to survive. In spite of this fact it is the United States' custom to measure the others needs by a ruler which measures the needs of her own country, which is the most blessed from the standpoint of nature, of any nation in the world. The fact that the position and circumstances of other countries differ from those of the United States apparently is not taken into consideration by the United States, Wakasugi said.

Japan occupies only a small corner of what is known as the Far East; moreover, she has been occupied for over four years with the China incident. She has, therefore, a number of circumstances which are peculiar to herself. So though she may want to comply with all of what the United States suggests, it is impossible for her to immediately do so. For example, for obvious and unavoidable reasons, Japan has established various organs and put into effect various systems in China to cope with temporary conditions and circumstances. Even if we tried to comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, we could not do so overnight where these are concerned. It would be an absolute impossibility from a practical and actual standpoint.

If the United States' principles are to be applied to the world at the end of the war, it is indeed a worthy undertaking and merits serious consideration. However, it is not in the realm of practicality to attempt to apply these principles at a time when the whole world is in a chaotic condition. It is asking too much of Japan to expect her to accept these principles under such world conditions, and to expect her, in turn, to apply them immediately to the Far East area which has been undergoing particularly unfavorable conditions.

Therefore, Wakasugi continued, the immediate need is to discuss matters which Japan is capable at the present time of carrying out. These actual problems should be worked out to the maximum point of possibility under present circumstances and in this manner, the first opening to the road of joint and cooperative action should be found.

Hull replied that he well understood Japan's position and the circumstances in which she was involved. However, he continued, the United States also has to cope with domestic problems. For example, there are complaints from U. S. business men in China who have been squeezed out or whose activities have been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude Japan has assumed in the China trade. When these complaints are voiced, because of the make-up of the United States, they cannot be left unnoticed.

Returning again to fundamentals, it is an unalterable fact, the Secretary continued, that the United States' basic principle is advantageous to Japan. For this reason he desired acceptance of it by Japan, the Secretary repeated.

He agreed to compare the two proposals on this point, too, and to submit a reply after so doing.

In conclusion Hull asked what the conditions were in Japan. Wakasugi replied that the general public were very strained. The government is being forced to take an immediate and decisive turn to either the right or the left. The people are apparently ready to jump at a chance for an understanding with the United States and because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, the tension will no doubt be immediately relieved if there is the slightest gesture on the part of the United States to warrant it.

Although it may be true that more time will be required before an agreement can be reached on the weighty items, however, there would be made favorable reactions if even minor matters, such as the following, were cleared up: releasing of the Itokusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru which have been tied up in San Francisco for over a month because the money with which to pay for their fuel has been frozen; releasing of funds with which to pay for fuel for those ships which are coming over here at present. (There is some interference from the Treasury Department in this instance).

As Wakasugi mentioned these items, Welles took down the names of the vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with bureaus concerned.

23818

JD-1: 5968

(D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 18, 1941

CA

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

Army 23803

Trans. 10/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 20, 1941

Purple (CA)

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such incoordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more or less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis this is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some *modus vivendi* between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some *modus vivendi* worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explored the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired you the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

Army #23774

Trans. 10-22-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 21 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #698

Re your #966*

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25(?) September.

23968

JD-1: 6015

(D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5968. (Long 6 part report). Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i. e. the Open Door up-to-date).

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 22, 1941
 Purple (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Army #23859

JD 6017

Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 23 October 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 Unnumbered

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

23860

JD-1: 6016

(D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 24, 1941
 Purple
 #995 (Part 1 of 4)

Re your #698^a.

On the 24th from 2:30 p. m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as “the Japanese Navy is ‘itching for action’”, and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.

Army #24002

Trans. 10-27-41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #23968 which points out the fact that the new cabinet is anxious as the former one to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations and that Japan has made her stand perfectly clear and can do no more. It furthermore directs WAKASUGI to inform the U. S. that Japan is not in a position to prolong the discussion and would like to be informed of the United States' counter-proposal to that of Japan's dated September 25th.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 24, 1941
 Purple
 #995 (Part 2 of 4)

WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other warlike statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.

Army 24003

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 October 24, 1941
 Purple
 #995 (Part 3 of 4)

"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.

Army 24004

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

October 24, 1941

Purple

#995 (Part 4 of 4)

WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point."

Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank."

Army 24005

Trans. 10/27/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

25 October 1941

(Purple—CA)

#709

Re your #989*.

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.

With regard to the military general staff office's message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message #698** (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U. S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.

24069

JD-1: #6117

(D) Navy Trans. 10-25-41 (S-TT)

* S. I. S. #23996.

**JD-1: 6015 (S. I. S. #23968). New cabinet sends first instructions on U. S.-Jap negotiations. The situation is at an impasse unless the U. S. will change its views.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
27 October 1941
(Purple)
#1004

Chief of Office Routing.

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.

Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a "strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.

Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to discuss peace and that without a doubt, Hitler is winning that battle.

Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.

24192

JD-1: 6175

(D) Navy Trans. 10-30-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

29 October 1941

(Purple)

#1008 (In 3 parts, complete)

From Minister Wakasugi

U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical cross-road. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions.

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called "Hitlerism", (establishment of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its war-time structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrolling over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on these grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in agreement with the British practice in the past of establishing special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of an absolute non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.) Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.

The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United

States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular) and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States. Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure.

Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that is not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces, (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.

In any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.

24250

JD-1: 6207

(D) Navy Trans. 11-1-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington, (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

29 October 1941

(Purple)

#1010 (In 2 parts, complete)

Chief of Office routing.

I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.

1. Admiral Standley, Retired, told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard O'Laughlin, who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo). There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times, 28th).

To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that British did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.

He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.

24376

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans, 11-5-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Nanking
 31 October 1941
 (Purple)
 #464

The agreement is to go into effect November 25th, and it is generally agreed between Japan, Germany, and Italy that it shall be continued for a period of five years. Negotiations should be begun between the three countries regarding the proposal for a new protocol. This is strictly secret and for your information.

24290

JD-1: 6225

(H) Navy Trans. 11-3-41 (5-AR)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #721

Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:

The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, (that part concerning the attitude of the respective nations to the European war); and, the three questions which were submitted concerning the United States' proposal of non-discrimination in trade, a subject which was put in as a supplement to Section 3, (concerning peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal.

According to your message #424*, you told Secretary Hull on 22 June that you could not deliver the official note to the home government. Moreover, there seems to be indications that the U. S. Government is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the matter of the right of self-defense.

In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchanging of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We must have this information to discuss this whole matter in a business like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem like bringing up old issues.

24531

JD-1: 6323

(D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 3271 (SIS #18717, and 18735) dated 24 June. Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U. S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U. S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#722

The Government has for a number of days since the forming of the new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial headquarters. We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you will handle everything with the greatest of care.

Army 24292

Trans. 11-3-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#723 (Part 1 of 2)

Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue. For six months, negotiations have been dragging along, and our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United States, in order to arrive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a considerable force stationed there. The United States must realize these facts and understand our position." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States and Japan to proceed amicably.

Army 24293

Trans. 11/3/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 2, 1941
Purple (CA)
#723 (Part 2 of 2)

On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much concerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, cannot tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese-English-American relations in order to reestablish and maintain the peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would transmit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) and endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.

Sent also to London.

Army 24294

Trans. 11/3/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
3 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#1021

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible will you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.

24424

JD-1: 6277

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 3 November 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #1025

Re your #721*

1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other.

2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our definite reply.

24476

JD-1: 6316

(D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (2)

*Available, being decoded; will be translated. Dated 1 November.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #725 (Part 1 of 3)

Concerning my #722^a.

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726^b and 727^b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure

of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

Army 24330
JD 6248

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Army 24331

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations—the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the concensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Army 24332

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #726 (Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, insofar as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly

explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

Army 24334

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Army 24335

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. *Explanation.*

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this

statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

Army 24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Army 24337

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #727

1. Proposal "B".

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to

put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in Netherlands India.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.

Addendum:

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three-Power Pact and the question of non-discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my #726^a.

Army 24338

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24334 to 24337.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
#730

Re my #725^a.

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving—on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right-hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.

Army 24339

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. Nos. 24330, 31, 32.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 4, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #731

Re my #725.^a

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

Army 24333

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24330, 31, 32.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #732

Re my #725*

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been lead to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States). Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point.

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor.

24372

JD-1: 6253

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6248. S. I. S. #34330.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#735

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U. S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726**) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U. S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725*. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727***). Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

(Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727***, there was no need for it, so please delete it.)

24387

JD-1: 6276

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6248 (S. I. S. #24330-32).
**JD-1: 6249 (S. I. S. #24334-37)
***JD-1: 6250 (S. I. S. #24338).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

24373

JD-1: 6254

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 5 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #1037

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite). I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on this point as soon as possible. If you believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced to the public.

24573

JD-1: 6364

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (2)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 5 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1040

Re your #735, paragraph 5*.

On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the

negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number).

While I recognize that the above may be considered as well intentioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the negotiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating American public opinion or causing it to become actively opposed to Japan.

There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given to the newspapers.

24479

JD-1: 6320

(H) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6276 (H-24387).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 6, 1941

Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#739

Re my #730.^a

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unravelling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU himself had a heart-to-heart talk with the American Ambassador here before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.

Army 24439

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24339 which states that Ambassador KURUSU is being sent to Washington on the 7th by clipper to assist in the Japanese-American parleys.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 6, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #740

Re your #1025.*

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.

Army 24442

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 6, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #741

Re your #1037.*

The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same secrecy.

Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with American officials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity.

Army 24440

Trans. 11/6/41 (S)

* Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 6, 1941
Purple
#1051

In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous conjectures and reports are published.

Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unforeseen influence on our already tense population. Considering the seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American relations, and, keeping a strict control, follow the most prudent policy.

Army 24552

Trans. 11/10/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
7 November 1941
(Purple)
#1053

Re my #1040*.

We are of the opinion that it is absolutely essential that, at this time, to either through direct means or through suitable indirect channels, strike home Japan's determinations to the U. S. Government. Under this assumption we are making every effort to carry this out.

As I pointed out in the message referred to in the heading, there is everything to lose and nothing to gain to resort to a press campaign at a time like this, for such a campaign is aimed at the general public. The Times Advertiser is referred to here as the official government organ. We urge you to make that paper refrain from too bluntly commenting on the negotiations. As a matter of fact, we would be in favor of their remaining completely silent. We are convinced that an ominous silence would have the best effect, so will you make arrangements towards this end immediately.

24645

JD-1: 6401

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6320 (S. I. S. #24479).

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 7 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1054

Re my #10—

I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his consideration.

With regard to the matter of nondiscrimination in trade, Hull showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either approval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self-defense and of withdrawal of our troops.

The interview lasted approximately one hour.

This message dispatched at 1330.

24576

JD-1: 6372

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 7 November 1941
 (Purple)

#1055 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)

I said that I had been instructed by my home government to explain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude and position in the hope of bringing about immediate settlement of the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In way of replying to this, Hull said that at present there were two political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism.

If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos.

I, therefore, said, in accordance with your various instructions, that:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically been reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan. ———(9 groups missed here———) I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

24577

JD-1: 6372 (b)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

MEMORANDUM

In JD-1: 6372 (b), the last paragraph on the first page of this message should be changed to read as follows:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan.

2. From the viewpoint of U. S.-Japanese friendship in its broad sense, the U. S. Government should take a philosophic attitude concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

S. I. S. #24577.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1055 (Part 2 of 3)*

(I pointed out that):

3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settlements as soon as possible.

4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceedingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in Tokyo are to be conducted.

Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal which you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept the terms contained therein.

Hull carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and commented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I replied that much the greater part would be withdrawn and only a small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance with your instruction which I received today.

It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted after this note had been carefully studied by them. They will submit their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I shall endeavor to make more detailed explanation.

24646

JD-1: 6372 (b)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (1)

* Parts 1 and 3—S. I. S. #24577.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 November 1941

(Purple)

#1055 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be consulted regarding Japanese-U. S. talks of maintaining peace on the Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being consulted with regard to matters pertaining to the China problems.

Hull then said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's attitude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's reaction be?

Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's attitude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be maintained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus have a very favorable effect on it.

We got the impression that he may have already discussed this matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascertained. I said that I would give it my consideration.

24577

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

9 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#751

Re the last part of your message #1055*.

We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace negotiations be begun.

We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this

phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever concrete plans the United States may have.

24579

JD-1: #6374

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6372 (b) (S. I. S. #24577).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 9 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #752

Re your #1040* and #1053**.

1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in its power to giving enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two nations confer). We shall prevent the publication of anything that may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigorous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any infractions.

2. We see reports from correspondents in the U. S. area, (for example from the Domei office in your city), which are not in accord with our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding the Japanese-U. S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there.

24580

JD-1: 6375

(D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6320 (S. I. S. #24479).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 10, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #755. Part 1 of 2.

Re my #754^a.

In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance on speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is the intention of the United States Government to mediate between Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Govern-

ment has been looking forward to since the beginning of ———. It would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would according to HULL's suggestion be left out for the time being from the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the settlement by means of negotiations conducted between Japan and China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about peace between Japan and China without American interference.

Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement that the settlement of the negotiations between Japan and the United States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and China its condition and that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Furthermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put into effect.

Army 24581

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

• Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 10, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #755. Part 2 of 2.

As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my #726^a (paragraph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my #727^b (namely that the United States will refrain from any action detrimental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China) be substituted in its place.

Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a speedy establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and so, for this reason, HULL's proposal is a sincere one and from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the China question until peace is established between Japan and China or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and, furthermore, would be apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations upon us. I need hardly point this out to you but I would like to have you take care so that this would not happen.

Army 24582

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #24334-37.

^b S. I. S. #24338.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 10, 1941
 Purple

#757 (Part 1 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 ^a and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations. I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.

Army 24583

Trans. 11/10/41 (s)

* S. I. S. #24330-32 states that as a result of a conference between the Foreign Office and the Military High Command, two new proposals, containing the final concessions Japan is willing to make, have been devised.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 10, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)

#757 (Part 2 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my #726 ^a and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents the maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this documents are many matters in which Great Britain's interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."

Army 24584

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24334, #24335, #24336, and #24337.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 10, 1941

Purple

#757 (Part 3 of 3) (To be handled in government code)

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."

Army 24585

Trans. 11/10/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (CA)

(Urgent)

#1066. Part 1 of 2

1. I sent MOORE * to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

Army 24655

Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

* Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 10, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 (Urgent)
 #1066 (Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Army 24656

Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 10, 1941
 Purple CA
 (Extremely Urgent)
 #1069

Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.

He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace."

He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.

I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this résumé.

Army 24652

Trans. 11/12/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1070 (Part 1 of 4)

(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department)

My interview with the President, referred to in my #1069,^a was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:

Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.

Army #24714

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #24652 which states that President ROOSEVELT will endeavor to continue the parleys and that what the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1070 (Part 2 of 4)

"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government."

I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:

1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.

2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and self-defense.'" (The English text used our expression as it stood.)

Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents."

Army 24715

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (Very Urgent)

#1070 (Part 3 of 4)

3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation."

Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.

In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will; just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working."

What the United States desires, according to the President, are: (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.

Army 24716

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 10, 1941

Purple (Very Urgent)

#1070 (Part 4 of 4)

The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic

limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a *modus vivendi* if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.

Army 24717

Trans. 11/13/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 11 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #762

Re your #1069*

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time

do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.

24653

JD-1: 6415

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*S. I. S. #24652.

**JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple)
#763

Re my #671*

With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambassador in Tokyo that in view of the present general relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.

24654

JD-1: 6416

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 5901 (S. I. S. #23631). Tokyo wires Nomura secretly that the Axis countries are demanding that Japan send a message to the U. S. stating that if the Roosevelt administration does not cease attacks on the Axis, it would provide reasons for convocation of the Three Power Pact and lead to war with Japan. Toyoda has to date held up such a note as well as information on talks with the U. S. in order to further those negotiations, but a warning note must now be presented by Japan in order to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact. (Msg. dated 16 October 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
11 November 1941
(Purple)
#764 (In 3 parts, complete)

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723.*) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is

to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week to ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving

indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070** (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations. etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

24824

JD-1: 6417

(D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6228 (S. I. S. #24293-94).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

11 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#1074

Re your #762*

After my conversation with the President, I told Hull that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.

As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will . . . after getting their opinions in tomorrow's interview.

24711

JD-1: 6453

(F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6415 (S. I. S #24653).

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 1 of 4)

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)

On the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about

an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my #1083^a and #1084^b. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese-Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to China too, an understanding would be possible.

He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States. However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."

Army 24794

Trans. 11/14/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #24785-24788, inclusive.

^b See S. I. S. #24789 for part 1 of 4. Other parts not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1087. Part 2 of 4.^a

To be handled in government code.

Then BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding.

WAKASUGI said:

"While we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or it is to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?"

It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.

Whereupon WAKASUGI asked:

"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?"

HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions.

Army 24837

Trans. 11/15/41 (2)

* For Part 1 see S. I. S. #24794.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 3 of 4)* (Departmental Secret). (To be handled in government code)

Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied with my explanation.

In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations concerned—for example, England and the Netherlands—to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, but afterwards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.

Army 24838

Trans. 11/15/41 (2)

* Part 4 of 4 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 12, 1941

Purple

#1087 (Part 4 of 4)^a

Departmental secret. (To be handled in government code.)

Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

HULL answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply."

WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems."

In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestions for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making ready for a quick reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.

Army 25428

Trans. 11/26/41 (X)

^a For Part 1 of 4 see S. I. S. #24794. For parts 2 and 3 see S. I. S. #24837 & #24838. A report of the conference between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary HULL with WAKASUGI and BALLANTINE present.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Vichy

November 12, 1941

Purple

#528

In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in violation of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river Aju^a. The French Indo-China authorities, I understand, claiming that they could not permit the Japanese Army to make such preparations because they consider the restrictions stipulated in the agreement still valid, refuse absolutely to recognize the demands of the Japanese Army. However, at the time the treaty for the joint defense was concluded, in anticipation of just such a case as this, we saw to it that a clause was inserted to the effect that the treaty includes

cancellation of the restrictions stipulated in the NISIHARA-MARU-TAN agreement. Therefore, urge them to issue at once definite instructions to the French Indo-China authorities to withdraw their claim and then wire me the results.

Army 24915

Trans. 11/18/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Toyko
To: Washington
13 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#766

Re your 1055*

1. Through the U. S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers".

You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give us a detailed report of this.

2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is apparently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We pleaded with the U. S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines contained in my various instructions on this subject.

3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please maintain strict secrecy regarding it.

24712

JD-1: 6455

(D) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6372(b) (S. I. S. #24577 & 24646).

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
13 November 1941
(Purple)
#1089

Re my #1087*

On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.

(1) Wakasugi said:

"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U. S. conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.-Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.

"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary.

"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals submitted by us on 7th and 10th of this month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that instrument her final proposal?

"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said.

Ballantine:

"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.

"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite replies.

(Part 2)

"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non-discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the nations at war."

Wakasugi:

"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U. S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."

(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758** and #764***, it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note.

Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:

"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain and The Netherlands to participate."

(Part 3)

Wakasugi:

"Leaving aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they represent—regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted—are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.

"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present proceedings as part of the negotiations."

(3) Regarding your message 766****:

The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we made a "concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.

For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.

If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of their proposal.

(Please insert "766-(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2) of this message.)

24882

JD-1: 6559

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6521 (S. I. S. #24794, 24837-38).

**JD-1: 6413 (S. I. S. #24650).

***JD-1: 6417 (S. I. S. #24824). (Note: In connection with this ref. see last sentence above.)

****JD-1: 6455 (S. I. S. #24712).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 14, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #772

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal

measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message #773.*
 Army 24791 Trans. 11/14/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #24792.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 14, 1941
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my #727^a.

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government (agrees?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understands to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of _____ of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)

Army 24792

Trans. 11/14/41 (S)

* S. I. S. #24338. Text of proposal "B".

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Hongkong
 November 14, 1941
 Purple

Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code)
 (Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

- a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
- b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nansō,^a Hokudai,^a Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai^a will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

Army 25322

JD 6801

Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

^a Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple

#1090 (Part 1 of 3)^a (Departmental Secret)

(To be handled in Government Code)

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust

southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

Army 24877

Trans. 11/17/41 (2)

* For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1090 (Part 2 of 3)^a (Departmental Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

Army 24857

JD 6553

Trans. 11/17/41 (7)

* Parts 1&3 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 14, 1941

Purple

#1090 (Part 3 of 3)^o (Secret outside the Department)

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through the Pacific area.

8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan.

Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894^a and 901^b sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.

Army 25139

Trans. 11/22/41 (NR)

^a S. I. S. #23166 in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation.

^b S. I. S. #23114 in which Ambassador NOMURA apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.

^o For Parts 1 and 2, see S. I. S. Nos. 24877 and 24857.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

15 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#774

Re your #1087*

During the conversations with Hull, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.

Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.

Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.

24833

JD-1: 6530

(D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6521 (S. I. S. #24787).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#775

Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of "the leaders". However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a "preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

24834

JD-1: 6531

(D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#781

To Ambassador Kurusu.

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not alone this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to

him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to any early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U. S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.

24873

JD-1: #6556

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#1095 (In 2 parts, complete)

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:

The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096*; separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area).

We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.

To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the

same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.

We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:

"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.

(Part 2)

"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.

"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."

We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there has been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.

Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S. R. neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-U. S. S. R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.

We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U. S.-Japanese peace and the continued existence of that treaty. We went on to say that our government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided to meet again after I had received my government's further instructions.

Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.

24930

JD-1: 6584

(D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6585 S. I. S. No. 24931.

**JD-1: 6586 S. I. S. No. 24932.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1098 (In 2 parts, complete)

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.

Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but

(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;

(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States—that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador—will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes). Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099* for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff).

I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.

In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and business men who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400), to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventuality should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.

It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and business men. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.

(Part 2)

In the event of (a)—

(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers). To the representative of

what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?

(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.

25032

JD-1: 6631

(D) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6654 (S. I. S. #25033)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

15 November 1941

(Purple)

#1106 (In 6 parts, complete.)

Chief of Office routing.

The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*:

Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to you as my message #1096**.

Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation". Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)

"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."

(Part 2)

So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message #1097***. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal

which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems, pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.

I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations."

Hull: "Your government may consider those talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlements we reached upon those other nations.

"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.

(Part 3)

"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that . . . (several lines missing).

"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."

He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.

(Part 4)

Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.

I therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our latest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we

made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."

Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text."

So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful intentions.

He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.

Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it—the general public—this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.

"If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would it?"

(Part 5)

"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, to participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous."

I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."

Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary. We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a "dead letter").

Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?"

Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".

Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?"

(Part 6)

Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U. S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy."

I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies."

We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.

Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.

Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.

25085

JD-1: 6627

(D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6584 (S. I. S. #24930).

**JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931 & 25006).

***JD-1: 6586 (S. I. S. 24932 & 25007).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
15 November 1941
(Purple—J 19)
Circular #2330

The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.

Note: Three paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines have not been printed.

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.
Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bangkok (?)
relay to Hanoi.

25235

JD-1: 6752

(D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#_____

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090^a, and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

Army 24878

Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a For Part 1, see S. I. S. #24877. For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 16, 1941

Purple

#782 (To be handled in government code.)

Re your #1083.^a

1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:

----- the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement, (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood.

2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression "without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.

In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.

Army 24879

Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24785-88, inclusive. The text of an oral statement given to Ambassador NOMURA by Secretary Hull at the conference on the 12th.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 16, 1941

(Purple)

#1107 (Departmental Secret) (Strictly Secret)

1. I sent ARMSTRONG to the State Department on the 15th to have him feel out the atmosphere (see my #1029^a). ARMSTRONG then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States. (I dare say, however, that the attitude of the United States toward us is just about the same as always and that this is just a ripple on the sea. Nevertheless, as we have heard the same thing from other quarters, I send it to you for what it may be worth.)

2. ARMSTRONG, furthermore, said that the advent of Ambassador KURUSU is having a very good effect. (The newspapers, too, in general, have been showing considerable good feeling. Two or three days before Ambassador KURUSU arrived at his post, not only did news articles become quite friendly toward him, but the press interviews in every place drew, in general, the most favorable comments. Will you also, therefore, direct public opinion along these lines.)

Army #24978

Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

* S. I. S. #24475 which describes the organization of a committee for the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and America in which TERASAKI is liaison agent and through ARMSTRONG keeps in contact with the State Department.

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1113

At 10:30 a. m. on the 17th I called on Secretary of State Hull accompanied by Kurusu, following which we both had an interview with the President at 11:00 which lasted for about an hour and 15 minutes. Today's conference was largely concerned with formalities and we did not get down to business. However, I stated that the intentions of the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific. (In regard to maintaining peace in the Pacific I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind). I will wire the details in a subsequent telegram.

25028

JD-1: 6648

(H) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1114

Schmitt's report:

On the evening of the 16th, we had Schmitt try to feel out the State Department's attitude. He reports that he talked with his good

friend Williamson (secretary to Assistant Secretary of State Hurley). According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actual points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and Japanese viewpoints. The difficulty seems to be a more spiritual one—that is, the suspicion that the United States harbors of Japan. The United States bases its suspicion on the fear that the German and Japanese military cliques will apply pressure and prevail upon the Japanese Government. In other words, the United States believes that there is a possibility that immediately subsequent to the establishing of a U. S.-Japanese accord, the Japanese Government may be forced by Germany or by the Japanese military to pursue a course entirely different from that charted by the accord.

Compared to the above obstacles, the solution of the economic problems, of which the petroleum question is one phase, is indeed a very simple matter.

25133

JD-1: 6693

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 16, 1941

(Purple)

#1118 (Part 1 of 5.^a) (To be handled in government code)

On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: They are: Equality in commerce, the Tri-partite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question—that of evacuation—he seems to entertain great concern.

Army 25091

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a Part 2, S. I. S. #24940; Part 3 not available; Parts 4 and 5, S. I. S. No. 25084.

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 November 16, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #1118 (Part 2 of 5)^a

Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL had expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a. m.

KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed—though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations—that the situation is militarily strained in Hongkong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled.^b However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops."

Army 24940

Trans. 11/18/41 (M)

^a Part 1, 3, 4 and 5 not available.

^b Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non-discrimination in trade.

 [Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 17 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1118 (Part 3 of 5)

The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said, 'There is no last word between friends'.

"There have been many so-called 'non-aggression pacts' in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved."

Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident

should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.

"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of an alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the maintenance of peace.

"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect."

The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'."

25129

JD-1: 6643

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

 [Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1118 (Parts 4 and 5 of 5) (Parts 1, and 3, not available). (For Part 2 see JD-1: 6643) (S. I. S. 24940).

(Part 4)

Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.

"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far outshine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away".

At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this."

Thus did Hull go over his theory again.

The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles."

Kurusu: Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.

"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful intentions.

"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull."

Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your—Kurusu's—attacking this point from a different angle."

The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.

25084

JD-1: 6654

(D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #783

Re your #1110*

We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.

24881

JD-1: 6560

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 17 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #784

Re your #1096*

By "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world", we mean that the Imperial Government desires that said principle would be applied uniformly throughout the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the principle will be applied on China as well.

We do not imply that the United States shall be held responsible for any violations of this principle outside of the United States' sphere of influence.

Even before the outbreak of this European war, the trend was away from the above mentioned basic principle. Since the outbreak of this war, practically all traces of the principle have been obliterated. Under these circumstances it would be only one with a very unrealistic view of the situation who could expect any fruit from an attempt to apply the principle to China alone.

Japan is not refusing to apply the principle on China on the grounds that a few nations in the world refuse to comply. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations therein are in favor of the principle.

(Through an error, the serial number 781 was applied on two messages**. Will you please give the number 781-B to that message dated the 16th which contained information for Your Excellency only).

24880

JD-1: 6561

(D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT)

*Not yet available.

**One available thus far. Dated 15 November; JD-1: 6556 (S. I. S. #24873).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
17 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#785

Re your #1097*

1. The contents of 3 of paragraph 2 pertaining to Japanese-U. S. relations, seems to be about the same as the terms contained in the supplementary provision of the United States' 21 June proposal. In view of the fact that "materials necessary for one's own country's safety and for self-defense" shall be an exception, there is a danger that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some restrictions on the exporting of petroleum. We cannot accept that phraseology, therefore, unless they agree not to restrict exports on articles needed by us which will be clearly listed.

2. Regarding sub-sections 1 and 2 of paragraph 3 of that message which concerns the policy on the Pacific area: Under paragraph 5 of the basic terms of Japanese-Chinese peace which was appended to our 25 September proposal**, regarding economic cooperation, there is no objection to a third country's engaging in economic activities in China as long as it is conducted on a fair basis. Our proposal is aimed at our having the right to develop and have access to natural resources vital to national defense. In view of the great sacrifices made by Japan in the past four and a half years, this is but a natural demand.

If, therefore, the United States recognizes the basic forms of our peace with China, and if the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the paragraph referred to, are meant to be the basis from which a permanent policy is to be established subsequent to the establishment of peace under the terms set forth by us, we shall give it our favorable consideration.

If, on the other hand, the contents of your message #1096*** and sub-sections 1 and 2 of the referred to message (1097*) are aimed at making us alter the basic peace terms, the Imperial Government finds them absolutely unacceptable.

(Part 2)

3. Re the same paragraph 3:

It is feared that the terms included in this paragraph will lead to joint supervision of finances and credit in China. Since this conflicts with the fundamental principles of the New Order policy of the Empire, (please point out that these terms conflict with the basic principles that the United States has been proclaiming of late, too), for that reason, it is impossible for us to give our approval thereto.

4. After all is said and done, the various paragraphs noted above are apparently parts of a proposal which is attempting to completely disregard our sacrifices during four and a half years of war. Settlement based on this proposal is absolutely out of the question. Since the United States herself has stated that this was an unofficial and exploratory proposal which has no binding powers, please lead the

United States to completely abandoning it and to proceed, using our proposal of 25 September as the basis on which to do so.

24937

JD-1: 6589

(D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6586 (S. I. S. #24932).

**JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51).

***JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo.

17 November 1941

(Purple)

#1127

The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations.

Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance was not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.

Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proofs of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.

Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.

He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.

There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China.

Details will be sent in a subsequent message.

25170

JD-1: 6722

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

18 November 1941 (Probable date of drafting)

19 November 1941 (Intercepted)

(Purple)

#1129

Re your #784* and my #1106**.

During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.

As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal "A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters any.

I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows "on the understanding", etc.

25241

JD-1: 6758

(D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24880). Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle.

**JD-1: 6627 (S. I. S. #25085). "The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you previously".

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

18 November 1941*

(Purple)

#1131 (Part 1 & 2 of 5)

(Foreign Office Secret)

(Chief of Office routing)

On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.

Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th). "In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East

* Translator's note: Date is evidently the 18th, though the first two parts were encoded with key for 17th.

Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the 'confused era (?)' and the turn about in Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union).

"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.

"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shall be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U. S. relations".

Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.

Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U. S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.

"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.

(Part 2)

"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the U. S. S. R., under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.

"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks."

Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.

"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do."

Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion."

Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms."

Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented."

Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1131 (Part 3 of 5)^a (To be handled in government code.)

"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to continue these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I an Ambassador KURUSU had something to say). If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend."

Army 25086

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a Parts 1 and 2 not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1131 (Part 4 of 5) (To be handled in government code)

Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your #726^a (of course, I didn't mention the twenty-five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my #1095.^b) KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries.

Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.

Army 25087

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a S. I. S. Nos. 24334, 5, 6, 7.

^b S. I. S. #24930 which gives an explanation of the U. S.'s stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1131 (Part 5 of 5) (To be handled in government code)

"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post-war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of non-discrimination. Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire #1132.^a)

Army 25088

Trans. 11/21/41 (1)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

(18 November—probable date of drafting)

(19 November—intercepted)

#1133 (In 2 parts, complete)

From Kurusu.

(1) According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States. Therefore,

we must exercise great care just now against forming a hasty conclusion that they are merely deferring in order not to seem to swallow our proposals at a gulp, and also against taking any steps that might prove irretrievable.

(2) As a result of the revision of the neutrality act, the attention of the United States has turned more than ever toward the Atlantic of late, and a determination is being strengthened to be ready even for a war with Japan if necessary. However, there seems to be a desire to be reassured as to their rear by negotiations with our country. Herein seems to be the chief reason why both in the conference with the President on the 17th and in the one with Secretary Hull on the 18th the point of emphasis was on the Three Power Pact, and there was more insistence than heretofore on this. In other words, the United States, in order to give the American people the impression that an estrangement is taking place between Japan and Germany, would make use either of a joint declaration by Japan and the United States regarding non-discrimination in trade, or of having Japan become party to a treaty on problems similar to those on which negotiations are now in progress between Britain and the United States, or again, of a message from our country giving a declaration of peace policies, as was suggested by Secretary Hull in conference on the 18th.

(3) Of course, any sudden change in the present status of Japanese-German relations would be out of the question, but in view of the above mentioned situation I feel that it is most essential that we do everything we can to fully reassure the United States and let them become more and more involved in the Atlantic areas, and thus place us in a favorable position, not only for effecting a settlement of the China incident, but also, in regard to the international situation following the war.

(Part 2)

In regard to the question as to whether after the war Britain and America will not turn their weapons toward oppressing us, in our conference on the 17th, I explained about the bitter experience that came to us after the former world war, and frankly told them how some of our nation have felt in regard to Britain and the United States. To this the President replied that the treaty now under consideration would "cover all" such points.

(4) In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that as a stop-gap for the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a "time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock, as them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for assurances regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.

In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July, but in view of the progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal

“B” or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China ----- Please have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re “time limit” and ----- as we desire to press for a speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at once.

25242

JD-1: 6759

(F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 18, 1941

Purple

#1134 (Part 1 of 2)^aRe my #1131^b.

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.

HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, “After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers.”

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal “B” immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal “A”. Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal “B” it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal “B” and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.

Army 25090

Trans. 11/21/41 (2)

^a Part 2, in S. I. S. #25243.

^b See S. I. S. #25086.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

(18 November—Probable date of drafting)

(19 November—Intercepted)

#1134 (Pt 2 of 2) (This message should probably be #1128).

It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133*. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)

25243

JD-1: 6760

(D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6759 (S. I. S. #25242).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

November 18, 1941

Purple

#788 (Strictly Secret)

Re your #1098.^a

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786^a for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will at this sailing have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staffs who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applicants. The reason was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents and so forth as are in the possession of Japanese companies and chambers of commerce.

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.
Army 24976 Trans. 11/19/41 (S)

• Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
Purple CA
#1135 (Departmental Secret)

On the evening of the 17th, both of us went to call on a certain cabinet member and this is what he told us:

"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to the reestablishment of normal trade relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the Americans."

Army 25089

Trans. 11/21/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J 19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

25432

JD-1: 6875

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (J 19)
 Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.); "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

25392

JD-1: 6850

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #798

Re my #797*

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite", we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.

We note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134*****, but in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.

S. I. S. #25040

JD-1: 6658

(F) Navy trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6657.

**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.

***JD-1: 6660.

****JD-1: 6661.

*****Not yet available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

19 November 1941

(Purple—CA)

#799 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the proposal for a joint declaration by Japan and the United States, given in your #1096*, there are many points to which it would be difficult for the Imperial Government to give consent, as I have already cabled you. Secretary Hull's advocacy of a reciprocal trade agreement stated in the same dispatch, we can consent to as something he has advocated for many years, but we imagine it would have as many as possible of the opinions of the State Department's China specialists woven into it. Therefore, if we were to go into a discussion of each of these particulars, we would have to give up hopes of the possibility of reaching a settlement in a short time, (see my #736**). Now that matters have progressed this far, we think the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters from going from bad to worse by long-view political adjustments, thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war.

(Part 2)

Therefore you will please delete from my #780***, paragraph 6 (nondiscrimination in trade) and paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Agreement) and add my #801**** as item 2 of paragraph 5, and hand this to Secretary Hull. This will "drop" the question of non-discrimination in international trade which has heretofore been an important pending problem between the two countries, and in view of the United States attitude regarding troops stationed in China, this will be made the subject of conversations between Japan and China, in an effort to ease up the present tension. ----- item 2: the transfer of troops from southern French Indo-China to the northern part, is an important concession we would venture to make for the sake of speeding the agreement, ----- in order to save the situation and with President Roosevelt's immediate (this should mean within one week) approval, have it ready for signatures of both countries.

Furthermore if they insist, it will be all right to agree to the ----- of 6 and 7 (non-discrimination in trade and ----- Tripartite Treaty)

of my #780***, but because of the reasons stated in your #1129****, in regard to our attitude to these two questions, we cannot change my #784*****. (As Hull at present does not seem to be taking so much account of matters in China, I think he (or we) will not insist on deleting from "on the understanding" on.

In regard to paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Treaty) see the latter part of my #800*****.

25035

JD-1: 6659

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931 and 25006).

**JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373).

***JD-1: 6555 (S. I. S. #24872).

****JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037).

*****Not available.

*****JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24880).

*****JD-1: 6660 (S. I. S. #25036).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #800

Re my #799*

Re paragraph 1 of my #781**.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific includes the Netherlands East Indies and Thai, but does not include China. Re item 2 of paragraph 3. All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement. Please bear in mind that paragraph 4 means the cessation of all help to Chiang Kai-shek by the United States.

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801***) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of no discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784****.

Re paragraph 7, item 2, the explanation of our attitude (- - - self-defense- - -) in the event of the United States entering the European war. - - - in such a case the Empire would- - - as to whether or not there had been an attack- - - the interpretation of the provision of the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Three Power Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).

25036

JD-1: 6660

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: (S. I. S. #25035).

**JD-1: 6556 (S. I. S. #24873).

***JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037).

****JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24880).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 19 November 1941
 (Purple) (Eng.)
 #801

The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

25037

JD-1 6661

(M) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 19 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1136

I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take—

- (1) Maintain the status quo.
- (2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
- (3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression arrangement.

No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.

No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. My #1134* of yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by the government is beyond my power of comprehension, but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come later.

I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary to my message of yesterday.**

25248

JD-1: 6769

(F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6665.

**Wash-Tok #1138 (JD-1: 6771) says: "At the end of my message #1136 (S. I. S. #25250) please add 'please convey the above to the (Prime ?) Minister'".

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
19 November 1941
(Purple)
#1140

Re your #791*

(1) We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all our arrangements with that as the basis.

We are also in receipt of your instructions concerning your conversations with the British Ambassador (your message #763***).

In view of those, we have been hinting to the United States that it is of much importance that we receive some definite reply within ten days and that it is impossible for us to continue with the negotiations if there is any further delay.

At a time when we are thus pressing them for an early reply, I feel that it would do us great harm were we to announce that we are having ships, with all the accompanying dark implications, leave on or about the 25th or 26th. We feel that such a statement by us would lead to their having doubts of the determined front we have been putting up. We feel that such a step would not be in accordance with your repeated instructions to bring about an early settlement.

In view of these facts, I beg of you to reconsider the matter.

If it is impossible to do so, please let us postpone our making that announcement for at least four or five days to permit us to see how the talks are progressing.

After you have given these points your consideration, please advise us.

(2) The number of persons connected with business firms who still remain here and who wish to return to Japan does not warrant the sending of a ship at this time. If it is for the purpose of taking our nationals home from Panama, we feel that a ship sent to South America could be rerouted for them.

(3) If the final decision is reached to have the ship sent here, there will be no difficulty in arranging matters for the evacuating of government officials and their wives. However, there will no doubt be much complication if it is your intention to have all men connected with business firms depart. We feel that it would be necessary that the home offices of these people should be notified, and that the said home offices should in turn send notifications and instructions to their personnel on the scene.

Please give these points your consideration.

25142

JD-1: 6708

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2)

*Not available.

**JD-1: 6254.

***JD-1: 6416.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 20 November, 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #806

It seems that your #1136* passed my #798** enroute, but under the circumstances here, we regret that the plan suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for saving the present situation.

We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our #798. Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion.

S. I. S. #25038

JD-1: 6663

(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*Not yet available.

**JD-1: 6658.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Ankara
 November 20, 1941
 J-16

Circular #2364 (Strictly secret)

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. However, there is great disparity between their opinions and our own. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situation not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

Army: 25427

Trans. 11/28/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 20, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #1144

At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798^a. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain," or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.

Army 25137

Trans. 11/22/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #25040. Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off.

[Secret]

To: Tokyo
 From: Washington
 November 20, 1941
 Purple (Very Urgent)
 #1147. Departmental secret

To be handled in Government Code.
 (Part 1 of 2)

Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)

First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798^a. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he has always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we knew, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be

impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.

Army 25179

Trans. 11-24-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 20, 1941

Purple

#1147 (Part 2 of 2) (Departmental Secret)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words, it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I proposed today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.

Army 25180

Trans. 11/22/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 20, 1941

Purple

#1148. (To be handled in government code)

Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144 ^a, expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.

Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no

doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.

Army 25174

Trans. 11/24/41 (2)

* S. I. S. #25137 in which HULL says that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding China.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

21 November 1941

(Purple)

#810 (Part 1 of 2) (Separate wire)
(Chief of Office routing)

Formal note

"I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an agreement drawn up between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America on the . . . (blank) . . . of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you the following information:

"For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion of peace throughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between Japan and the United States.

"The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the government of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, therefore, beg permission to draw your government's attention to the contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only if it is included), thereof.

"The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the United States; the China Incident; and, the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included in the agreement).

"The two governments have made a joint declaration including the above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the United States.

"Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agreement may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your government and mine on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await your government's advice that it would be similarly disposed.

"Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

—formal close—

/s/

(Part 2 follows)

25126

(JD-1: 6687)

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 21 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #810 (Part 2 of 2)

Formal reply

"I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Understanding which has been drawn up between your government* and the government of the United States dated the ----- (blank date)----- of this month and your accompanying explanatory note.

"Your explanation was to the effect that -----.

"I have the honor to inform you that I am receipt of a reply from my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your country and mine on the points specifically enumerated above.

"Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place)**

—formal close—

/s/

**

25126 JD-1: 6687

(D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

*Japan.

**This is Japanese language epistolary style.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 21 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #811

In case you use Proposal "B"* for an agreement, as an introductory paragraph please tentatively incorporate the following draft:

"The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America, impelled by their strong desire of preserving peace in the Pacific, and recognizing the vital importance of a frank expression on the part of both countries of a sincere determination to embrace peaceful methods, declare it as their mutual understanding that:"

25130

JD-1: 6688

(M) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6250 (S. I. S. #24338).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 21 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #969

At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the U. S. S. R., so that she—Germany—may transfer her entire fighting forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from the standpoint of reconstruction.

Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national greatness.

For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to mediating in a peace, if such a course is possible.

Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on developments----- (message unfinished).

25171

JD-1: 6731

(D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941
 Purple CA (Urgent)
 #812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736^a. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

Army 25138

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #815

The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain will all six sign the protocol.

Germany, fighting Russia as she is, seems to be thinking about the propagandistic effect of this signing. However, we, for several considerations, intend to handle the matter circumspectly. You know we have Japanese-American relations to think about. This is for your information.

Army 25140

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941.
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #816.

So it seems that the United States is reluctant to definitely promise to do nothing to prevent the establishment of peace between Japan and China in accordance with Clause 4 of Proposal "B". Well, if they will accept our proposal "B", we will have no objection to letting President ROOSEVELT be our introducer. Through his mediation, on the basis of the American proposal (B) of the 12th, China would be made to express her friendly intentions toward Japan, and, as a result, peace negotiations would ensue. Then as soon as an armistice agreement were established between Tokyo and Chungking, there would be no basis in fact for continuance of American assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Thus, as a result of the mediation which President ROOSEVELT would exercise, CHIANG KAI-SHEK would by the American Government be caused to propose a cessation of hostilities. The American Government accordingly, hoping for the establishment of amicable relations between the Japanese and Chinese, should do her best to support our efforts in this direction and they should make it clear that they will refrain from any act that would hinder us in achieving this objective. Therefore, will you please endeavor to have the Americans accept our "B" proposal and, in case an understanding is reached, please endeavor by the date set in my #812^a to have the President prevail upon CHIANG KAI-SHEK to send us a peace proposal (a very brief one will be all right).

Army 25175

Trans. 11-24-41 (2)

^a S. I. S. #25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 22, 1941.
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)
 #817

Re your #1144.^a

I take it that the "B" plan which you proposed on the 20th included the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to northern French Indo-China, and left out (6) concerning non-discrimination in commerce and (7) the Tri-Partite Treaty. Am I right? Wire me back just as soon as you get this whether or not the Americans took any particular note of the fact that you left out (6) and (7).

Army #25212

Trans. 11-25-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25137—Ambassador NOMURA says Secretary HULL has expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion except with regard to China. He said that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 22, 1941
 Purple
 #1158 (Government Code) (Secret outside the Department)

Re your # 817.^a

As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147,^b no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.

Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL at 8:00 P. M. today, the 22nd.

Army 25181

Trans. 11/24/41 (2)

^a Available, being worked on.

^b See S. I. S. #25179-80.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 23 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1159 (In 4 parts, complete)

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State, Hull. (Ballentine was also present). The resume of our conversation follows:

Hull: "I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to

cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.

"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.

"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.

"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.

"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you."

*(Part 2)**

Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said * * * (two or three lines too badly garbled).

I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?"

His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.

(Part 3)

He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given by Japan in her proposals were insufficient.

I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area."

After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by

the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.

Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's Pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."

Regarding aid to China, Hull said:

"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U. S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.

(Part 4)

"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.

"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."

He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.

I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval."

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."

25347

JD-1: 6839

(D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (2)

*Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 November 1941

(Purple)

#1160 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #1159*

From Kurusu:

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the

Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.

He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai ?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.

(Part 2) (Garbled)

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.

"I would like to see the U. S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.

"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal".

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.

25397

JD-1: 6857

(D) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (2)

*JD-1: 6839 (S. I. S. #25347).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

23 November 1941

(Purple)

#1161 (In 2 parts, complete)

Regarding my #1160*

General outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows:

Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday. They were all advised of this and are to meet again on Monday, after they have reported to their own government and received their answers.

Hull continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although he understood the reason for Tokyo's demand of urgency regarding the matter, he does not seem to see the reason why Tokyo can not wait a few days.

The Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yesterday, getting up from bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the conference.

According to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the Japan-China incident right now, or to give up aid to China, (however the aid to China today is not to a very great extent). It seems as though he wishes to handle (discuss) the China incident later.

According to reliable information it seems that to station troops for duration of necessity can be considered as stationing of troops indefinitely, but if it was stated that troops were to be stationed for a certain period of four or five years, at the end of which period conditions were to govern restationing of troops, there might not be so much opposition. But with just an indefinite stationing of troops for an indefinite period, it would be against the U. S. policy which is against annexation and interfering with self-government. (The fact that during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went into French Indo-China, causing the conference of that time to be broken off)—the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting that it was hoped a similar occurrence would not develop this time.

He continued that to merely move troops which were in southern French Indo-China to the north would not relieve the tension in the south Pacific or relieve the anxiousness of the countries of the south Pacific, etc. so that it was explained that to an experienced military observer this was great information and should add much to the peace of that part. Hull explained that the contents of the conference would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later said he would mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understanding much about military aspects.

I presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer of yes or no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal was a demand on the United States by Japan, and seemed very displeased. He said there was no cause for Japan's making such demands, and that he was greatly discouraged in the attitude of Japan of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard to arrange a peaceful negotiation between the two countries.

We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the same.

Hull explained that the United States was following peaceful attitude in the negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this peaceful attitude of the United States throughout the negotiations.

25588

JD-1:

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (X)

*JD-1: 6857 (S. I. S. #25397).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 24, 1941
 Purple (Very Urgent)
 #821 (Government Code)

1. It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions.

2. Our expectations, as I told you in my #798,^b go beyond the restoration of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 7. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the government of the United States finds it hard to accept it makes us here in Japan suffer inordinately. Therefore, on the basis of what I told you in my #816,^c as well as all that has gone before, please make every effort to persuade the Government of the United States.

3. Insofar as what we propose in Proposal B is concerned, the United States has misconstrued it as our demand. We here in Japan, in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly for a speedy settlement. Naturally, that's all we want. Speaking further on this, it is necessary to warn the United States against enticing England, Australia, the Netherlands, etc., in paving the way for a joint hostile set-up. As you have written, we would like to secure the agreement of other competent countries in accordance with the gist of my #731^d at the same time Japan and the United States reach an understanding.

Army 25176

Trans. 11/24/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal B to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.

^c See S. I. S. #25175.

^d S. I. S. #24333 in which Tokyo instructs Washington to impress upon the American officials the importance of having Great Britain and the Netherlands also agree to the proposals.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 24, 1941
 Purple (Very Urgent)
 #822. Secret outside the department.

Re my #821.^a

On the 23d I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to visit me and added the following to what I had told him in my caption telegram: The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-

China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America. At the present time a total withdrawal of troops is utterly impossible and when the American President, acting as a spokesman for CHIANG KAI-SHEK, brings a proposal of peace to Japan in the China question, if Japan accepts this and enters into negotiations, it is only proper that we demand that America should not interfere with our efforts for peace. The above solution is not only the best, but the only way. Until this point is made clear, it is absolutely incompatible with the sentiment of the Japanese people to settle the Japan-American negotiations and it is impossible for us to understand why America does not agree to this. I have been making the greatest efforts for our new proposal from the standpoint of cooperation with the American peace policy and have tried to cut down our stipulations, making them clear and concise. When these negotiations are established, we intend to pursue an increasingly peaceful policy on this basis. After I had told him this, the Ambassador left at once to cable the gist to his home office.

Army 25177

Trans. 11-24-41 (S)

* S. I. S. #25176.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 24, 1941
 Purple
 #823 (Restricted Distribution)

For both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message #812 ^a is in Tokyo time.

Army 25178
 JD 6744

Trans. 11/24/41 (NR)

* S. I. S. #25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Nanking
 25 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #499

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while.

25390
 JD-1: 6848

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 25 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1177
 Re your #792*

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.

25434

JD-1:6880

(H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Hanoi
 To: Tokyo
 25 November 1941
 (Purple—YO)
 #118

(Strictly secret.)

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have been laid down in advance.

Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since practically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to move within the day.

Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enterprises. We shall, undoubtedly, have to establish organs and conduct negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of war, the status quo will be maintained as far as the French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned. I feel that it is essential

that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately as we wish to make all prearrangements as far in advance as possible.

If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart to us.

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. According to press reports, however, the United States conferred with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (courier ?) service, the military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations.

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message #2353* the situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable or by special messenger services.

25345

JD-1: 6838

(D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S-TT)

*Available, dated 19 November.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok

To: Tokyo

25 November 1941

(Purple)

#849 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834* was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen "bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened . . . (three lines missed) . . . stop with as simple a . . . as possible to the effect that "will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia coprosperity and stability", while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty . . .

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia coprosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent ----- by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

25389

JD-1:6844

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

*Available, dated 21 November.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#830

To both Ambassadors.

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798,^a my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal *in toto* (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816,^b the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

Army 25790

Trans. 12-5-41 (6)

^a S. I. S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the U. S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

^b S. I. S. #25175. If the U. S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#833 (To be handled in Government Code)

Re my #798^a

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly 333,000 tons per month.

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.

Army #25346
E

Trans. 11/26/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 November 26, 1941.

Purple

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai (The question of nondiscrimina- tory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Joocho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Joocho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyunten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617

Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793

The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614

The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022

Army #25344

JD-6841

Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 26 November 1941 (1745 EST)
 (Telephone code)*
Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto** from Kurusu:

Wakasugi speaking, said:

"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu's request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet Hull with whom they had an appointment at 4:45."

Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?"

Wakasugi: "The would (arrange ?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversations."

Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."

Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?"

Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to interceptor and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.

(Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening).

25348

JD-1: 6842

(M) Navy Trans. 26 Nov. '41 (12-TT)

*See JD-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25344).

**Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
 (Telephone Code)**

Trans-Pacific Telephone

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will not yield*.*** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

25349

JD-1: 6843

(M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

**See JD-1: 6841, (S. I. S. #25344), of this date.

***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

Army 25435

JD: 6891

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941
 Purple (Extremely urgent)
 #1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

Army 25436

JD: 6896

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941.
 Purple (Extremely urgent)
 #1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Army 25441

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941
 Purple (Extremely urgent)
 #1189. (Part 2 of 2)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Army: 25442

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 26, 1941
 Purple (Extremely urgent)
 #1190. (Part 1 of 2)^a

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189^b) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set—

Army 25444

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

^a Part 2 not available.

^b S. I. S. #25441.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1190. (Part 2 of 2)^a

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

Army 25480

Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

^a S. I. S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2).

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1191 Part 1 of 4.

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192^a, 1193^b and 1194^c, and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."

(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."

HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the fact of that."

Army 25481

Trans. 11/29/41 (2)

^a See S. I. S. #25485.

^b See S. I. S. #25489.

^c See S. I. S. #25491.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1191 Part 2 of 4.

To be handled in government code.

(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insurances so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.

HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."

(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to revive a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.

Army 25482

Trans. 11/29/41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely Urgent)

#1191 Part 3 of 4

(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."

In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected

immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."

I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."

(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the United States to hope, on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question 'apologize to Chungking' is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 'introducing'."

HULL made no special answer.

Army 25483

Trans. 11/2/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 26, 1941

Purple (Extremely urgent)

#1191. (Part 4 of 4)

I said, "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan, and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.

Army 25484

Trans. 11-29-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#841

Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English text of the B Proposal:

Delete the "the" preceeding the word "peace" in "the peace in the Pacific";

Change "elucidating" to affirming";

Change "agreed upon" to "reached; and

Delete "mutual" from "mutual understanding".

25791

JD-1: 7079

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
 To: Washington
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #842

In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about.

Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter.

25781

JD-1: 7080

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 27 November 1941
 (J 19)

Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete)

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

“Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed”, will read:

“HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell).”

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word “OWARI” (end) will not be used).

(Part 2)

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and (blank) have been severed.
HATTORI'	Relations between Japan and (blank) are not in accordance with expectation.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA	Japan's and (blank's) military forces have clashed.
HOSINO	Japan and (blank) are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you --?-- the . . . (blank) . . . matter?
ISHIKAWA	I have --?-- the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing <i>military action</i> ? against . . . (blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA	Japan.
KOMIYAMA	China.
KOYANAGI	England.
KUBOTA	U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA	France (?)
KUSUNOKI	Germany.
MATUTANI	Italy.

(Part 4)

MINAMI	U. S. A.
MIWATA	Canada.
MIYAZAKI	Mexico.
MOROKOSI	Brazil.
MOTIZUKI	Panama.
NAGAMINE	Argentina.
NAKAZATO	Thailand.
NANGO	French Indo-China.
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO	Malaya.
OKUMURA	Australia.
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODERA	Enemy country.
OTANI	(?) (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI	Year.
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki) Month

<i>Code Word</i>		<i>Meaning</i>
SIGENOI	(KŌ)	Paragraph
SANZYŌ	(Toki)	Time
ITIRŌ	1	
NISAKU	2	
SANTARŌ	3	
YOITI	4	
GORŌ	5	
MASAROKU	6	
SIMETARŌ	7	
YASOKITI	8	
HISAMATU	9	
ATUMI	0	
25609		
JD-1: 6985		(Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

27 November 1941 (2327-2334 EST)

(Telephone Code)—(See JD-1: 6841) (S. I. S. #25344)

Trans-Pacific

Telephone

(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)

Literal translation

Decode of Voice Code

(After connection was completed:)

KURUSU: "Hello, hello. This is Kurusu".

YAMAMOTO: "This is Yamamoto".

KURUSU: "Yes, Hello, hello."

(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or to someone near him:)

KURUSU: "Oh, I see, they're making a record of this, huh?"

(It is believed he meant that the six second interruption was made so that a record could be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine had been started several minutes earlier.)

KURUSU: "Hello. Sorry to trouble you so often."

YAMAMOTO: "How did the matrimonial question get along today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, haven't you got our telegram* yet? It was sent—let me see—at about six—no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. About three hours ago.

"There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."

"How did the negotiations go today?"

"There wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of yesterday."

*Literal translation**Decode of Voice Code*

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, there wasn't much difference?"

KURUSU: "No, there wasn't. As before, that southward matter—that south, SOUTH—southward matter, is having considerable effect. You know, southward matter."

YAMAMOTO: (Obviously trying to indicate the serious effect that Japanese concentrations, etc. in French Indo-China were having on the conversations in Washington. He tries to do this without getting away from the "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" character of the voice code.)

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, the south matter? It's effective?"

KURUSU: "Yes, and at one time, the matrimonial question seemed as if it would be settled."

KURUSU: "But—well, of course, there are other matters involved too, but—that was it—that was the monkey wrench. Details are included in the telegram* which should arrive very shortly. It is not very long and you'll be able to read it quickly."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, you've dispatched it?"

KURUSU: "Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At about 7 o'clock."

(Pause.)

KURUSU: "How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be born?"

YAMAMOTO: (In a very definite tone): "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."

KURUSU: (In a somewhat surprised tone, repeating Yamamoto's statement):

"It *does* seem as if the birth is going to take place?"

(Pause.)

KURUSU: "In which direction. . ."

(Stopped himself very abruptly at this slip which went outside the character of the voice code. After a slight pause he quickly recovered, then to cover up the slip, continued:)

KURUSU: "Is it to be a boy or a girl?"

YAMAMOTO: (Hesitated, then laughing at his hesitation took up Kurusu's cue to re-establish the voice code character of the talk. The "boy, girl, healthy" byplay has no other significance):

YAMAMOTO: "It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy."

"Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement".

"Does it seem as if a crisis is at hand?"

"Yes, a crisis *does* appear imminent."

"A crisis *does* appear imminent?"

*Literal translation**Decode of Voice Code*

KURUSU: "Oh, it's to be a strong healthy boy?"

(Rather long pause.)

YAMAMOTO: "Yes."

"Did you make any statement (to the newspapers) regarding your talk with Miss Kimiko today?"

"Did you make any statement regarding your talks with the President today?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing. Nothing except the mere fact that we met."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matter contained in the telegram** of the other day, although no definite decision has been made yet, please be advised that effecting it will be difficult."

KURUSU: "Oh, it is difficult, huh?"

YAMAMOTO: "Yes, it is."

KURUSU: "Well, I guess there's nothing more that can be done then."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, yes."

(Pause)

YAMAMOTO: "Then, today . . ."

KURUSU: "Today?"

YAMAMOTO: "The matrimonial question, that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a marriage—don't break them off."

"Regarding negotiations, don't break them off."

KURUSU: "Not break them? You mean talks."

(Helplessly:)

KURUSU: "Oh, my."

(Pause, and then with a resigned laugh:)

KURUSU: "Well, I'll do what I can."

(Continuing after a pause:)

KURUSU: "Please read carefully what Miss Kimiko had to say as contained in today's telegram*."

"Please read carefully what the President had to say as contained in today's telegram*."

YAMAMOTO: "From what time to what time were your talks today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, today's was from 2:30."

(Much repeating of the numeral 2)

KURUSU: "Oh, you mean the duration? Oh, that was for about an hour."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matrimonial question."

"Regarding the negotiations."

"I shall send you another message. However, please bear in mind that the matter of the other day is a very difficult one."

Literal translation

KURUSU: "But without anything,—they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born. On top of that Tokugawa is really champing at the bit, isn't he? Tokugawa is, isn't he?"

(Laughter and pause.)

KURUSU: "That's why I doubt if anything can be done."

YAMAMOTO: "I don't think it's as bad as that."

YAMAMOTO: "Well,—we can't sell a mountain."

KURUSU: "Oh, sure, I know that. That isn't even a debatable question any more."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, then, although we can't yield, we'll give you some kind of a reply to that telegram."

KURUSU: "In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

YAMAMOTO: "Will you please continue to do your best."

KURUSU: "Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And Nomura's doing everything too."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, all right. In today's talks, there wasn't anything of special interest then?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing of particular interest, except that it is quite clear now that that southward—ah—the south, the south matter is having considerable effect."

YAMAMOTO: "I see. Well, then, good bye."

KURUSU: "Good bye."

25443

JD-1: 6890

(M) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 ()

*JD-1: 6915 (S. I. S. #25495). Outline of interview on 27 November with Roosevelt-Hull-Kurusu-Nomura.

**Probably #1189 (S. I. S. #25441-42). (JD-1: 6896). Washington reports the two proposals presented by the U. S. on 26 November.

Decode of Voice Code

"But without anything,—they want to keep on negotiating. In the meantime we have a crisis on hand and the army is champing at the bit. You know the army."

"Well,—we can't yield."

"In any event, the President is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1204

Re your #842*.

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.

As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N. E. I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N. E. I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.

I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message #1180**. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.

25535

JD-1: 6914

(D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)

*Not available.

**JD-1: 6891 (S. I. S. #25435-36).

[Secret]

From: Washington.
 To: Tokyo.
 27 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1206 (In 4 parts, Part 4 not available)

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The résumé of our talks follows:

The President: "In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both

Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think.

"Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U. S. relations will be settled peacefully."

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, during the several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality." (He apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message #1205*.) "I fully understand that the general public in Japan who has been living in war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions.

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secretary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This has made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking.

(Part 2)

"Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 'modus vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United States do not agree. If there is a basic difference, no stop gap measure could carry any weight, it seems to me.

"In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been clearly defined in advance."

Kurusu: "Judging from the records of the developments of our negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications thereof. For a very simple example Japan has no disagreements to the principle of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly advocated by the United States.

"However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been the source of some misunderstanding."

Hull: "By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various business enterprises. There have been indications that various incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants

and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceedingly difficult one."

Kurusu: "Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but concern only the various major problems."

(Part 3)

We then went on and brought up the subject which has reference to the President's "suggestions".

The President: "have not abandoned giving consideration to that matter. However, it is first essential that both Japan and China simultaneously desire that that be done."

We pointed out that from a practical standpoint that would be very difficult to accomplish. To this, the President said:

"In domestic issues, I have had several experiences along the same lines. No doubt, some method will be found in this case, too."

I. "We have, as yet, received no instructions from Tokyo regarding your proposal. I, for one, hope that you, Mr. President, whose statesmanship I respect highly after over thirty years of close acquaintance with it, will find some way that will lead to a settlement."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I have since the end of last week, twice postponed a trip which I was going to take for my health, because of a critical domestic issue, and because of the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States. I am leaving tomorrow afternoon, Friday, for the country for a rest." (He looked very tired). "I plan to return next Wednesday. I would like to talk with you again then. It would be very gratifying, however, if some means of a settlement could be discovered in the meantime.

(Part 4 not available.)

25495

JD-1: 6915

(D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

27 November 1941

(Purple)

#1206 (Part 4 of 4) (Parts 1, 2, and 3 previously translated)

In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the failure to agree upon a modus vivendi, said:

"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her.

"It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese-U. S.

differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon promoting the establishment of a New Order through might. This is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs."

Parts 1, 2, & 3 see S. I. S. 25495.

25608

JD-1: 6915

(D) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941.
Purple (CA)
#844

Re your #1189 ^a

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 ^b and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

Army 25445

JD 6898

Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442.

^b S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 28, 1941
J 19 (Priority)
#118

Re your #232 ^a.

To be handled in government code.

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the

usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

Army 25859

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25432 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast in the event that code communication is cut off.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Hanoi

November 28, 1941

Purple (YO)

#93

Re your #118 ^a.

The trend of Japan-American negotiations is as I told you in my circular #2414 ^b. The current outlook is as I delineated in my circular #2416 ^b. Even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no decisions with regard to changing the position of the French Indo-Chinese Government. Therefore, I would like to have you give due consideration to the policy of maintaining the status quo for the time being. If you have no objections, bearing this in mind, I would have you act with prudence.

We have transmitted this to France and Germany.

Army 25547

Trans. 12-1-41 (5)

^a S. I. S. #25345 in which Hanoi suggests that they be advised as early as possible whether the status quo will be maintained as far as French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned, so that pre-arrangements can be made.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Rio

To: Santiago

November 28, 1941

J-19

Circular #326 (Message from Tokyo Circular #2416)

(To be handled in Government code)

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

Army 26000

Trans. 12/9/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 28, 1941
 Purple (Priority)
 #1209. To be handled in Government Code.

What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand. Even supposing there is no armed collision with British forces, in the Oral Statement of President ROOSEVELT on the 17th of this month he prophesied that suitable action would be taken immediately in case Japan carries on any further penetration beyond French Indo-China. Moreover, newspaper reports at present would tend to lead to the conclusion that, even though England and the United States might not oppose us militarily within Thai, the United States assisting all nations concerned would adopt the policy of so-called joint defense throughout the whole southwestern Pacific area; thus, as I said in my #1204 ^a, there is no slight possibility that she might occupy the Netherlands Indies on the excuse that this action would be necessary for purposes of defense. I am sure you already have all these things in your mind, but in view of the gravity of the present situation, I just wanted to remind you again.

Army 25793

Trans. 12-6-41 (X)

^a S. I. S. #25535 in which Ambassador NOMURA discusses the United States' occupation of Dutch Guiana and says it is believed that, depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-American relations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. He says it is essential that the Japanese give careful consideration to this possibility.

 [Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 November 28, 1941
 Purple
 #1214. To be handled in Government Code

Re my #1190 ^a

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the paper: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

Army 25548

Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

^a S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumptio

[Secret]

From: Hsinking
 To: Tokyo
 November 28, 1941
 Purple
 #781. Strictly Secret

To be handled in Government Code.

In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below. We are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions regarding them, please wire me at once.

I. *Policy.* On the outbreak of war with England and the United States, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo.

The control of such property as they might leave behind will be administered by the Manchukuo Government.

II. *Detailed outline.*

1. Persons to be interned:
 - a. British nationals—339.
 - b. American citizens—81.
 - c. Of these, consular officials and Catholic missionaries are to be given preferential treatment.
 - d. Nationals of the Soviet or other third powers observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of.
2. *Time and Method of Internment.*
 - a. Persons mentioned in the paragraph above are to be advised to get in touch with the Japanese Chief of Detention. They are to be concentrated in the three areas, Harbin, Mukden and Chōkinshū.*
 - b. Then, depending on negotiations, they will be returned each to his own country. When evacuation is through the Soviet, we will release them at Manchuli, and when they are to be transported to Shanghai, they will be released in Dairen.
 - c. This will be carried out by the Manchukuo Police authorities. (In Kwantung Province the procedure will be controlled by the Provincial Police Office.)
 - d. All property left behind is to be administered through legal measures by the Manchukuo Government.

* Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 29 November 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #857

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

25496

JD-1: 6921

(F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (S. I. S. 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 29 November 1941
 (Purple)
 #1216

In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant where reference is made to "authoritatively stated" and to an "administration spokesman". We understand that Roosevelt particularly requested that the source be kept unclear.

(Please exercise caution in handling this).

25711

JD-1: 7038

(D) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Berlin

To: Tokyo

29 November 1941

(Purple)

#1393 (In 3 parts, complete)

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops*, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Part 2)

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next Spring Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?"

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules."

I. "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time."

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility."

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

Ribbentrop: "Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia."

4. In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. How-

ever, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"

Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year.

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point."

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

(In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote * * * "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" * * * That should have read: "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

25556

JD-1: 6942

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)

* See end of message.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#872 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re my #855.*

As a result of my conversation with PIBUN**, I have been able to ascertain his attitude to a large degree, and therefore through Yoshioka who as the outside agency of the Naval Attache's office, we have suggested to SIN and WANITTO*** that, in the event of Thai's abandoning her neutrality policy in the future, it would be better both from the standpoint of face and also for material reasons for her to go through the formality herself of requesting cooperative action from the nation concerned, rather than to be put in the position of being compelled to consent to it because of pressure brought to bear. The shifts within the government mentioned in my caption message, are a result of the above. When SIN heard this from Yoshioka, he said that this is a matter he has been concerned over the past two years, and as he feels that he himself is the most suitable person to handle the matter he promised to put forth every effort for its realization. He is also said to have told WANITTO that the matter should be left to him. WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate

guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attache' so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department).

(1) Whenever there is discussion in the cabinet the points raised are, the real intentions of Japan, that is, the meaning of the East Asia Coprosperity plan, the involvements of the southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of the time of stationing troops. Great Britain seizes upon these points and furnishes all kinds of contradictory material with which to keep the pro-British elements busy. To meet this WANITTO presents the absolute necessity of union between Japan and Thai and this has already become the firm conviction of the pro-Japanese group, and there thus is no need for further discussion as far as they are concerned. However the opposition have been bringing up troublesome arguments and hold tenaciously thereto. Since it was so difficult to convince them an appeal was made to us for material with which to counter them and their arguments.

(2) Since then the pro-Japanese group have been having better success in their attempts, and their position has become more favorable. As a result the opposition, since about the 25th has kept silent. However, the matter has not been concluded.

(Part 2 being translated)

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#872 (Part 2 of 2)

3. The question of joint military action between Thai and Japan has already been brought up by the pro-Japanese faction, but up to date, they have expressed a desire to pursue a course of strict neutrality. They had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless of whether this be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be considered Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as Thai's helper, she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggressor. For the purpose of accomplishing this, Japan should carefully avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of KOTAPARU in British territory, which would almost certainly force Britain to invade Thailand from PATANBESSA. The consequence would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain.

This strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this plan has the approval of Chief of Staff BIJITTO. Our naval Attaché has advised the Naval General Staff, also, I think.

4. WANITTO and SIN are both considerably concerned of the weak character of PIBUN. As a means of making PIBUN make a decision, they think that it would be well to have some outside pressure brought to bear on him. As one means, they suggest that some undesirable Japanese be forcibly removed from Thai by Japan, and then to publicize this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of Japanese nationals from Thai.

From the above and from other considerations, including that of the tone of PIBUN's radio broadcast which was reported in my message #871****, the situation here may show some unexpectedly speedy and

favorable developments. I feel that we should not fumble this situation, but should proceed carefully and take the best advantage of it.

25499

JD-1: 6923

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6881 (S. I. S. #25417).

**Premier and Foreign Minister.

***Actively in charge of Foreign Office.

****Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941

Purple (CA)

#985. (Part 1 of 3)^a

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 °) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Army 25552

JD: 6943

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

° Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553

^b Not available.

° See S. I. S. #25554, 25555.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941.

Purple (CA)

#985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

Army 25553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941

Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

Army 25554

Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Berlin
 November 30, 1941
 Purple
 #986. (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

Army 25555

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
 Telephone Code
 TransPacific Radio Telephone

(NOTE.—Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so?"

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause.)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We *are* being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan.)

Y: "No particular ---- (one or two words faded out)----."

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see—this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause.)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

25497

JD-1: 6922

(M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

November 30, 1941

Purple

#1222 (Secret)

Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines. They printed especially noticeably the sentence, "The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans 'must be purged with vengeance'." On the other hand, according to the newspapers, a White House secretary has issued an announcement to the effect that Secretary HULL had at once telephoned the President, resting at Warm Springs, concerning the Premier's speech and, as a result, the President, changing his schedule, was leaving Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 30th and is expected to return to Washington on the morning of the first. Inasmuch as this speech will be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans, will you please take suitable steps. Furthermore, will you please send me at once copies of the text (both Japanese and English)?

Army 25761

Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Manila (Nihro)
 To: Tokyo
 November 30, 1941
 Purple (Priority)
 #809

Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 29th.

As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram — number of words 18.)

Will you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code.

25862

Trans. 12/7/41 (6)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 December 1941
 (Purple—CA)
 #865

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

25605

JD-1: 6983

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921 (S. I. S. #25496).
 **JD-1: 6710 (S. I. S. #25138).
 ***Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2436

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals

they have on hand for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545

JD-1: 6939

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2444

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message #2447*, the U. S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington.

25606

JD-1: 6984

(D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*Not available.

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: London
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2443

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YŪ GŌ No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

25787

JD-1: 7091

(H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: Hsinking.
 1 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #893

----- In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ----- in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan..

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

25783

JD-1: 7092

(H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (5-AR)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 1 of 3)^a

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable."

25778

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

JD-1: 7042

* For Part 2 see S. I. S. #25715.

*JD-1: 6921 (S. I. S. #25496).

**Available, dated 30 November (S. I. S. #25761).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available)

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China . . . the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

25715

JD-1: 7042

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1225 (Part 3 of 3)

(Purple)

Hull: "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position."

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

"As I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem."

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs."

25778

JD-1: 7042

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1226

Re my #1222*

Following up the reporting of Premier Tojo's speech, the press here carried reports of the speech delivered by Vice President Ando of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association, on the 30th. Special attention was paid in these dispatches to those parts of the speech in which the Vice President advocated the reinvigorating of the alliance ties with Germany and Italy, and where he pointed out the United States as being the biggest obstacle to the establishment of the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere.

This report together with the report of President Roosevelt's sudden decision to return immediately to Washington and the disclosure of Hull's conferences with the British Ambassador on the 29th and the 30th, is attracting considerable attention of the general public

The general tone of these reports is that Roosevelt decided to cut his vacation short and rush back to Washington because Hull advised him by telephone that Premier Tojo had made an unusually strong speech, and relayed to him that a Far Eastern crisis may be at hand. Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were withheld, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted to it by the United States on the 26th. These circles also seem to feel that the speech indicated Japan's decision to give up hope for the talks and to resort to stronger measures.

The press on the 1st carried a U. P. dispatch from Tokyo reporting that though Japan was not satisfied with the United States' reply, Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this report has an ominous tone about it.

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of Thai has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe, to launch this attack.

25726

JD-1: 7054

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727

JD-1: 7055

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

1 December 1941

(Purple)

#1230

Re your #865.*

The immediate reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington are as I reported in my message #1222**. Basically speaking, however, the United States has been aroused against us by the reports of Premier Tojo's speech to Parliament, and by the speech of Cabinet official Kaya and Suzuki to the Convention of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association. The dispatches concerning these speeches gave one the impression that anti-foreignism, crushing of Britain and the United States, were the points most emphasized.

Japan's true motives are being further doubted here because of the reports of increased troop movements in French Indo-China.

Thus, in the midst of this atmosphere, fraught with suspicion as it was, the report of Premier Tojo's speech arrived, in which it was alleged that the Premier advocated the purging of all Britons and Americans out of the Far East.

Since the alleged speech was made at a time when the United States was expectantly awaiting our reply to their official note of the 26th to Japan, particular importance was attached to it. (It is possible that the U. S. Government assumes that the speech was made by way of expressing our complete disapproval of the U. S. proposal and that it foreshadowed our launching a military campaign. Some of the newspapers go to the extreme of commenting that if the speech is given a literal interpretation it can mean nothing except a declaration of war.)

The President's speeches concerning foreign affairs are consistently very cautiously worded, for they are usually taken as a description of U. S. national policy. It is almost natural that people who are accustomed to interpret speeches in that manner, reacted the way they did to the Premier's speech.

I assume that you have already taken measures to do so, but may I suggest that when the Prime Minister or any Cabinet officer is to touch upon Foreign Affairs, careful consideration be given to those factors. I make this suggestion only because our country is at a very critical point in her history. Even if the worst eventuality

materializes, we should be in a position to show all neutrals and outsiders the complete innocence on our part.

25728

JD-1: 7056

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

*JD-1: 6983 (S. I. S. #25605).

**Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
December 2, 1941
Purple

CORRECTED TRANSLATION

#867. (Strictly Secret)

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna."

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860^a is no longer recognized.)

Army 25640

Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41

^a S. I. S. #25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Havana
December 2, 1941
J 19-K 9

Circular #2445 Strictly secret.

Take great pains that this does not leak out.

You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication).

2. As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word Haruna.

3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.

4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm — — —.

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle and Portland.

Army 25879

Trans. 12/8/41 (3)

[Secret]

From: Bern (Mitani)

To: Ankara

December 2, 1941

J 19-K 9

(Tokyo Circular #2447)

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of *Oite* and "L".

Relay from Berlin to Lisbon, Helsinki, Budapest and Vienna; Relay from Rome to Bucharest, ———; relay from Berne to Vichy, Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid; relay from Rio to Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, ———, Mexico, Panama, Bogota; relay from Bangkok to Hanoi, Saigon; relay from Canton to Haihow, ———.

Army 25837

Trans. 12/6/41 (M)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Singapore

December 2, 1941

Purple

Circular #2450 (5 parts complete.)

Re my Circular #2409^a.

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KIKUTI	Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA	Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually stopped.
(DE ?)GUTI	. . . (blank) . . . (blank) . . . has been forced backward at . . . (blank) . . .
AYAOKA	The Burmese Independence movement is gradually gaining momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this with every resource, however, the movement is gradually growing more fierce.
ITAGISI	On the . . . the Burma . . . (blank) . . . was attacked by the Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI	On the . . . th in the . . . (blank) . . . area rioting broke out.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
MIYAMOTO	I will continue the action I described to you until advised by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.

(Part II)

KITAMURA	Recently . . . (blank) . . . American military planes arrived at . . . (blank) . . .
MUTO	. . . (blank) . . . and pilots numbering . . . (blank) . . . arrived at . . . (blank) . . .
NAGAOKA	. . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) . . . troops arrived at . . . (blank) . . . and left for . . . (blank) . . . on the . . . th.
INABA	. . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) . . . troops are reportedly concentrated on the . . . (blank) . . . border.
YASIROEN	The Independents movement at . . . (blank) . . . and negotiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA	At present there is a total of . . . (blank) . . . enemy merchant men docked at . . . (blank) . . .
HINO	Merchant ships now docked at . . . (blank) . . . are as follows: American . . . (blank) . . . ; British . . . (blank) . . . ; Netherlands . . . (blank) . . .
NAGAI an merchant ships left for . . . (blank) . . . loaded with arms.
HIGUTI	Our means of communication with Burma and the South Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.
SEGAWA	Our resident Nationals have been camped.

Part III

YASUI	It is reported that riots are breaking out.
NARUSE	Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.
KUBOTA	Oil fields bombed.
NIBA	The residents of ————— area re preparing to flee.
MOORI	Orders issued to residents of . . . (blank) . . . area to flee.
SEKYA	Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO	Netherlanders.
OCHIAI	Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBARA	Japanese.
NISIYAMA	-----
YAMANOUTI	Premier.
NOSE	Specialists' Commission.
KURODA	High tide (?)
HIRAI	Some officers and private citizens -----.
INOYAMA	Telegraphy.
ENDOO	The Yamashita Agency.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ATUKAI	The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI	India.
ABE	Java.
EDOGUTI	Sumatra.
HIROSE	Celebes.
HUKUI	Borneo.
INOUE	_____
FUKA	British India.
KASAURA	Ceylon.
IKAWA	_____

(Part IV)

HUJIMURA	Hainan Island.
IJIMA	The Spratleys.
ARIASA	Singapore.
HURUYA	Pinan.
NIWA	Bangkok.
KAMIYA	Chien mai* _____ Singora.
ISIDA	Saigon.
NINOMIYA	_____
HOSOKAWA	_____
NEZU	Tonkin.
YOKOTA	Cambodia.
NUMATA	_____
WATANZAKA	Manila.
NOZAKI	_____
KERI	Batavia.
SEKINE	Menado.
SERISAWA	Makassar.
SONE	_____
ANDO	Pankaran-Brandan*.
DOBASI	Pankan Susu*.
FUKUSIMA	Mandalay.
HAKAMATSU	Palembang.

PART V

ISTUMOTO	Jambi.
NAKINO	Tarakan.
MAKINO	Pa _____ Pan.
SAKURAI	Sageirinda*.
TAKANO	Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA	Puura*.
YANAGIYA	Banka*.
WATAGI	Biriton*.
EGAWA	Sunda*.
AIDA	Malacca.
BANDO	Sumaran*.
FUNABASI	Timor.
IKEDA	New Guinea.
KATAGIRI	Lashio.
MIZOCUTI	The Perurisu* region.
NUKADA	The Geta* region.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
SAWAKAWA	The Kota Bharu Region.
TAKESITA	East.
UTSUNOMIYA	West.
YAMANE	South.
ARAMAKI	North.
DOOKE	Island.
Army 25943	Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

* See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.

*Kana spelling.

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

To : Santiago

2 December 1941

(J 19)

Circular #328

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November

Re my Circular #2409.*

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
KASIMA	Have Japanese living there been interned? .
KANŌ	Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI	Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO	Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO	The wave length of General Information broadcast will be changed to . . kilocycles from . . . (day) . . . (month) . . .
KAKAO (Kayao)	Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please change wave length.
TUJIKITA	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present wave length.
TABUSE (Tabuti)	Please change wave length of General Information broadcast to a longer wave length.
SAITŌ	The time of General Information broadcast is to be changed starting on . . . (day) . . . from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
HAYASAKI	Please change time of General Information broadcast, starting on . . . (day) . . . to, from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
ISEZAKI	100 (hyaku).
WANAMI	1,000 (sen).
YASUNO	10,000 (man).
UNO	100,000 (jyu man).
ITIOTA	1,000,000 (hyaku man).
(perhaps ITIOKA)	
(probably UTIOKA)	
26144	
JD-1:	(Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6985. List of code words similar to above.

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)

To: Santiago

2 December 1941

(J 19)

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete)

Tokyo to Rio as Circular #2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular #2409*.

The following are added this date to my Circular #2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's note. Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ASHINA*	From . . . (blank) . . . (date), Japanese ships stopping here will not be allowed to take on fuel.
DATE*	Please telegraph probable amount of . . . (blank) . . . that can be imported.
KAWAHARA	I estimate we can probably import about . . . (blank) . . . tons of . . . (blank) . . .
NIWAGUCHI (Kawaguchi)	It is impossible to carry out . . . (blank)
NAKAMUTA (Nakamura)	. . . Are in the process of arranging for importation of . . . (blank) . . .
SATUNAKATA (Munakata)	Send communications via . . . (blank) . . . (country).
KAZAMA	Communications will be through offices stationed in . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TOKUSIMA	Japanese ship should arrive in . . . (blank) . . . (country) on . . . (blank) . . . (month) . . . (blank) . . . (day).
TAKENOUTI	Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to . . . (blank) . . . (country)?
YA GI (YANAGI)	It is not possible to send Japanese ships to . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TONEGI	It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to . . . (blank) . . . (country).

(Part 2)

TAKAGI	Minerals
SAWAMURA	Lead.
SUMI (Kasumi)	Mercury.
IWASAKI	Petroleum.
HIROHATA	Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI	Platinum.
KADA	Copper.
NAKAGAWA	Carat.
MAEHATA	Peru.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
MASUKO	Chile.
SENEDA	Colombia.
TAKENAKA	Paraguay or Uruguay (?)
SIMAZU	Paraguay or Uruguay. (?)
IMAZAWA	Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE	San QINY**
HASIMOTO	Cuba.
SINDŌ	Havana.
TIBA	Rio de Janeiro.
TOZAWA	Sao Paulo.

(Part 3)

HASEGAWA	Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE	Santos.
ENOMOTO	Baurū.
BEPPU	Curityba.
TIKAMATU	Belem.
SUETUGU	Buenos Aires.
OKIZUMI	Santiago.
YAMATO	Lima.
UMEGAWA	Bogota.
HARA	Caracas.
ISONO	Montevideo. (?)
FUKAMATI	Asuncion.

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo. Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

25830

JD-1

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

*JD-1: 6985 (S. I. S. #25609). List of code names to be used in plain language messages, with indicator S T O P at end.

**Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).

***Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago."

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 December 2, 1941
 Purple
 #1232 (Part 1 of 2)

COMPLETED TRANSLATION

Re my #1231.^a

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.^a Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that

she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

Army 25659-B

Trans. 12/3/41 (7)

* Not available.

*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple

#1232 (Part 2 of 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot over-emphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settle-

ment. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233^a.

Army 25660

Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple (Urgent)

#1234

Strictly Secret.

Re your #862^a.

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

Army 25730

JD: 7059

Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

December 2, 1941

Purple

#1239

Re my #123.^a

On the 2nd in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations.

Army 25690

Trans. 12/4/41 (NR)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Canton
 To: Tokyo
 December 2, 1941
 J-19

#512 Secret outside the department

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

(Japanese)

Army 26103

Trans. 12/11/41

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 Tō: Washington
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)

#875 Chief of Office routing

Re your #1232*.

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

25725

JD-1: 7057

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021 (S. I. S. #25659-60).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 3 December, 1941
 (Purple)
 #876

Re your 1227* (Washington to Tokyo).

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposal failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision.

25699

JD-1: 7018

Navy Trans. 12-3-41

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #877

Re #1225* from Washington to Tokyo.

Your message #1225* of course refers to the U. S. proposal of June and our September proposal but it goes without saying that the one we are holding to now is our 20 November proposal, which now supercedes the September proposal.

25700
 JD-1: 7019

Navy Trans. 12-3/41

*Not available.

 [Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: Washington.
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #878 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re your #1225*.

Chief of Office routing.

1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations.

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.

(Part 2)

2. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a

U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.

3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.

25720

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7042 (S. I. S. #25715).

**Available, dated 3 December.

***JD-1: 6737 (S. I. S. #25174).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: ——(Circular)

3 December 1941

(PA-K2)

Circular #2461

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)* (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is as a precaution.

25855

JD-1: 7123

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*“Hidden Word” code to be used in plain Japanese language messages.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Vancouver

3 December 1941

(PAK-2)

#92

Please retain the “hidden meaning” codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them.

26787

JD-1: 7775

(D) Navy Trans. 12-24-41(CN)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #1243

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

25721

JD-1: 7050

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #1243

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098

(D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Washington
 To: Tokyo
 3 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #1245

Terasaki now in the midst of — — — intelligence work at a most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go by the sailing on the 19th. Takagi busy on Tatsuta Maru business. (Negotiating with State Department for securing space) — — —
 — — — air plane.

(NOTE.—Many gaps in this message.)

25722

JD-1: 7051

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
 To: Tokyo
 December 3, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #1256.

Re your #875 ^a.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on

this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

Army 25849
JD: 7128

Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

* See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

[Secret]

From: Rome
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple—CA)
#985

Re your message #985* to Berlin.

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area."

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I

said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i. e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point."

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

In the first part of this message, please correct "N-NKEN WA" to "KINKENSHA WA".

25833

JD-1:

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-TT)

*JD-1: 6943 (S. I. S. #25552-53).

**JD-1: 6944 (S. I. S. #25554-55).

***Not available.

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#892

In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness. Therefore please have the Finance Minister appoint a suitable person as a member of the Embassy Staff, and send him out as soon as possible.

25724

JD-1: 7053

(F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Peking

To: Net

3 December 1941

(Purple)

Circular #616 (In 3 parts, complete)

Peking to Tokyo #763 (Most secret outside the Ministry).

Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China.

Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff.

Nishimura, 4th Section, Staff Headquarters.

Kazayama, Chief of Staff.

Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board.

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the following conclusions and decisions were reached:

“If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. Instead quiet such things immediately and settle in a most advantageous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these districts should be carefully planned anew with the above in view. For example, ‘the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia’ should be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen the unity of the people while guiding the world’s public opinion in a direction beneficial to Japan. Thus both during the period of war and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest benefit will accrue to Japan.

“Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must make an impression so as to draw them towards us and against the United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere to existing international laws, etc. and under no condition should any action which would look like ‘stealing while the house burns’ to foreign countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for a small immediate local profit.

(Part 2)

“In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the expected coming war the only one who can be imagined as an intermediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step which is taken in the occupied territory. And for this reason too the enemy’s position should be considered, and the handling of enemy churches etc. in China should be carefully studied.

“It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength must be saved. For this reason matters other than political or economic, that can be handled by China should as much as possible be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the Chinese, too.

"It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly studied.

(Part 3)

II "The military will of course try to handle matters as much as possible according to the International code. They will increase even more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied territories."

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here
----- (2 lines garbled) -----

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of fact he had been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.)

"It is of course important to obtain materials, but regarding easing the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be studied from various angles."

III Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned, and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces and different methods of leading North China politically were being studied.

26881

JD-1: 7848

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-26-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
Purple
#881

Re my #867.^a

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them. If you have not yet burned the keying described in my Circular #2400^b, keep it in your custody until the last moment. Moreover, send it by some suitable plane to our ministry in Mexico in care of Junior Secretary MATSUI or Secretary NAGAKI in San Francisco or some other suitable courier. Wire this to Mexico and let me know what reply they make.

Army 25754

Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25640 which gives instructions regarding the destruction of codes.

^b See S. I. S. #25753.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 4, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #891

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #1256^a.

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875^b. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

Army 25731
 JD-7105

Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

^a Not available.
^b S. I. S. #25725.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Net
 December 4, 1941
 Purple
 Cir #2467

Departmental secret to be handled in Government code. Strictly secret outside the department.

On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in case of a sudden change in the International relations. It is as follows:

Policy

When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo's relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherland Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end.

The Principal Points.

1. Manchukuo shall not recognize either the consuls and _____ or _____ as enjoying _____ privileges and shall forbid them to carry on their duties. (The use of code telegrams and short wave radio sets shall be prohibited). Furthermore in regards to the treatment to be accorded, performance of their duties. Manchukuo shall accord treatment in the spirit of fairness following the methods employed by Japan in dealing with latest _____.

2. Manchukuo follows the same methods as Japan in dealing with public and private properties of _____ and the _____

3. Manchukuo shall not recognize any request addressed to any third power for the protection of consulate buildings and the interests of the residents. However, Manchukuo shall carry out her legal measures following the methods employed in Japan for dealing with _____ and do so in the spirit of fairness and justice.

4. In the treatment to be accorded the citizens of Soviet Russia residing in Manchukuo in view of the existence of a neutrality treaty between Soviet Russia and Japan, she shall keep in step with Japan and take every precaution so as not to provoke Soviet Russia.

This message sent to Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai.

(Japanese)

Army 25994

Trans. 12/9/41 NR

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking

December 4, 1941

Purple

Circular #2468 Separate wire, Restricted Distribution.

(Secret outside the Department).

1. Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power. Already they have put into force prohibitions regarding the use of codes and are exercising rigid control and surveillance of our officials (consequently it is indicated that they are positively working in conjunction with enemy powers).

2. In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. In the event that a state of war exists between our country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. Otherwise, in accordance with International Law, we will treat her as an enemy nation.

A. The advantages accruing the Netherlands Government through repudiation would be that at the same time she carried out her repudiation she would declare the Minister to be persona non grata. Though there are indications that she has gone beyond this, there will be no need to handle the situation any other way but in accordance with (1) above.

B. Should the Netherlands Government repudiate this, there will be no responsibility under International Law for the Netherlands to protect our nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. Then, too, even after a state of war has been brought about in her relations with us, she will be forced to stand in the position of not accepting a protest under International Law. Then again, she could bring about great inconvenience by demanding the evacuation of our Consular officials.

C. To date the Netherlands Government has actually maintained her position under International Law, but should she repudiate this, there would be no advantage in any other plan but A, mentioned above. Then, too, in the event that the Netherlands Government begins hostilities, this would indicate her intention to repudiate our relationships and there would be no necessity to handle her in any other way but as a qiesa enemy nation.

(Translation sketchy due to garbles.)

Army 26101

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/11/41

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Hsinking
 December 4, 1941
 Purple
 #909 (Strictly Secret)

Re my #892^a.

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873^a our policy was changed as follows:

"When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly."

Wherever "England and the United States" and "English and Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and Netherlanders."

(Japanese)

Army 26142

Trans. 12/11/41 (5)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Berlin
 To: Tokyo
 December 4, 1941
 Purple (CA)
 #1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

Army 25807
 JD-7134

Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 5 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #896

Re your #1245*

Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

25839
 JD-1: 7140

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7051 (S. I. S. #25722).

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

#1261 (In 2 parts, complete)

On the 5th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secretary Hull, and, putting the matter contained in your instructions in writing, submitted it to him.

Hull: "You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive action."

We: "Whether or not they would attack and where from if they do attack, depends entirely on such things as the military strengths of each and on other considerations. We who do not have a clear picture of the exact conditions on the scene, cannot make any explanations other than those contained in the instructions we receive.

"However, the fact remains that there is a possibility that the Chinese would take the offensive. We have been in receipt of advices for some time past that the Chinese have been concentrating large forces in the Kwangsi area."

Hull said that he would relay the explanations to the President.

While we were there, we continued along the following line:

"Fundamentally speaking, it was because we wanted to avoid just exactly what happened as a result—namely, the misinterpretations and the consequent belligerent argumentations—of the President's most recent inquiries, that we wished to bring about a speedy settlement through our 20 November proposal.

"You keep bringing up the subject of our occupation of French Indo-China. Basically this is merely a phase of 'power politics'. Your country herself, has stated that the 'best defense is an offense'. Your military men in particular have taken this adage literally, and as proof thereof, have been making every effort to strengthen the army and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being flaunted before their eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned."

So saying, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message

#878**.

(Part 2)

Hull: "Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 July when Japan occupied the southern part of French Indo-China, the United States continued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan. During that time, I was the target of terrific criticism for allowing this, from Senators and from many other sources. Even in those times, the opposition to allowing this was of blistering intensity. Public opinion would absolutely prohibit the resumption of exporting of petroleum to Japan today."

We: "If the relationship between Japan and the United States underwent some improvement and if peaceful cooperation between our two countries is established, in accordance with that which is Your Excellency's custom to advocate, the concern you express now would automatically be dissolved.

"We are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the above described ideal situation, is to settle our major differences indi-

vidually, rather than attempt to reach a blanket agreement, along the lines proposed by us on 20 November."

Hull then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other publications were making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement. We therefore said that the same can be said of a portion of the U. S. press and went on to relate to him the contents of paragraph 1 of your message #878**.

(Translator's note: Last 5 lines of text unreadable).

25842

JD-1: 7139

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

**JD-1: 7049 (S. I. S. #25720).

*JD-1: 7105.

[Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

#1268

Re your #867*.

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836

JD-1: 7136

(M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (S. I. S. #25640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

[Secret]

From: Peking

To: Tokyo

5 December 1941

(Purple)

Cir #625—(Circular Number) To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

26108

JD-1: 7335

(H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)

*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Peking.
 To: Shanghai.
 5 December 1941
 (Purple)
 #626 (Circular)

Peking to Tokyo #770 (To be handled in government code)

Re your Circular #2467*
 (Strictly confidential)

1. It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded them in occupied territory. We have gone ahead with our preparations on this basis. This is for your information.

2. Is there any objection to our adopting the policy of recognizing a suitable person of a third power (say for instance Belgium, Spain, or Brazil) as custodian of the interests of Britain, America, and Holland in North China.

Relayed to NANJŌ (GAISIN), Shanghai.

26107

JD-1: 7334

(H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (5-AR)

*JD-1: 7246. Re policy of Manchukuo in event Japan enters war. S. I. S. No. 25994.

[Secret]

From: Panama (Akiyama)
 To: Tokyo
 5 December 1941
 (PA-K2)
 #367

Re your #134.*

Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance with instructions.

26068

JD-1: 7313

(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (7)

*Available, badly garbled, not yet identified.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 6, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #897

Re your #1268.^a

To Counselor IGUCHI from KAMEYAMA.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867^b was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Army 25835

Trans. 12/6/41 (S)

^a Not available.

^b S. I. S. #25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office

[Secret]

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

PA-K2

#899 (Strictly Secret.)

1. The recent occupation of Netherlands Guiana by American troops, or call it what you will—occupation it is, is the first example in the present war of the United States' invading South America. In the light of the Havana agreement, French territory may next be expected to be taken over. As for the Good Neighbor Policy, so far it has been used merely for getting military bases and aeronautical rights together with certain economic and financial interest. But now that the situation is tenser, the hitherto good neighbor, the United States, will no longer hesitate to use arms. This at length has come to the surface, and we must be on the strictest alert.

2. Based on an agreement with France, we penetrated Southern French-Indo China for joint defense. Scarcely were our tracks dry, when along comes good old nonchalant America and grabs Netherlands Guiana. If she needs any of the American countries for her own interest, hiding under the camouflage of joint defense, she will take them, as she has just proven. This is a menace to the Latin American nations; so will you please at every opportunity, impress upon the Government and people of the country to which you are accredited that the United States bodes them naught save ill. Moreover, please investigate the following points and wire me back.

(1) Has there been any other agreement or understanding established between the Netherlands Government and the Latin American Nations and the United States besides the one concerning Netherlands Guiana? If so, what is it like with reference say to bases, troop movements, annexation, etc.?

(2) The attitude of the country to which you are accredited toward this act of aggression, and the trend of public opinion.

Please send to all Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America (including San Paula).

Sent to Washington. Washington will send to Ottawa.

25868

Trans. 12/7/41 (7)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#901

Re my #844^a.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902^b (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make

every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Army 25838

JD: 7149

Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

^a See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

^b Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1: 7143

25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense

of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1:7143
25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental —(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1:7143
25843

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-17143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

25843

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would

endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41(S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 4, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

25843

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is

presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD-1:7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States,

Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD1-7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD-1: 7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

From: Tokyo

To: Washington

December 6, 1941

Purple

#902. (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of

frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD-1: 7143

Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

25843

*Probably "and as."

**Probably "China, can but."

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple—Eng)
#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

25843

JD-1: 7143

(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#904

Re my #902.

There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Army 25844

JD: 7144

Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
December 6, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#1003

Re 2 of your #1418 ^a.

1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985 ^b, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash

with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question.

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a ----- statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly.

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 or 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind.

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

Army 25925

Trans. 12/8/41 (NR)

^a Not available.

^b Parts 1 and 3, S. I. S. Nos. 25552, 3; Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo

To: Canton

December 6, 1941

Purple

#225 (Strictly secret)

Re your #516 ^a.

You are to note the following points:

1. In your communication to the British and American Consuls, the statement, "We will take over the concessions and other interests", is not necessarily accurate so you had better change it to "We will place the settlements and other interests under the control of the Imperial Army."

2. The evacuation of the Consular staffs and resident Nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may proceed to handle this matter.

3. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates, and buildings will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be in our custody.

4. Private property, even though it might serve us in some military way, cannot be seized. It might merely be taken over and kept under surveillance.

(Japanese)

Army 25997

Trans. 12/9/41 (5)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Bangkok
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
(CA)
#852.

The (——)^a day (X Day) decided by the ——^b liaison conference on the 6th (?)^c is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this message, please reply to that effect.

Army 25881

Trans. 12/8/41 NR)

Translator's assumptions:

^a "Proclamation" or "declaration."

^b "Ambassadorial" or "China."

^c This word is garbled and could be either the word "6th" or the word "November."

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advise of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us ----- (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) -----.

Army 25846

JD: 7176

Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
 To: Tokyo
 December 6, 1941
 Purple

#919 (Departmental Secret)

Re your #821^a and #23^a addressed to Your Excellency from Singora.
 All telegraphic codes referred to have been destroyed on December 5th
 Army 25885 Trans. 12-8-41 (NR)

^a Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
 #907 To be handled in government code

Re my #902.^a

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

Army 25850

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

^a S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #908 (To be handled in government code)

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

Army 25853

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Urgent)
 #909

From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attache IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YŪKI.

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Army 25858

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Washington
 December 7, 1941
 Purple (Extremely Urgent)
 #910

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 ^a and also #907 ^b, #908 ^c and #909 ^d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

Army 25854

Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

- ^a S. I. S. #25843—text of reply.
^b S. I. S. #25850.
^c S. I. S. #25853.
^d S. I. S. #25858.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
 To: (Circular)
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)

#2492 Confidential within diplomatic circles.

The Departments concerned have been giving study to the question of handling enemy subjects, and enemy property in Japan, as well as the handling of neutrals, and on the 6th the results were reported to the Imperial Headquarters; the main points of which I am giving in my separate circular #2493*. Both this message the separate message are addressed to Manchoukuo, Taiwan, NANSŌ, (for foreign propaganda), Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton.

Peking will contact Kalgan, and *Dairen* (?). Tsingtao will contact Tsinan; Canton will contact Amoy.

25966

JD-1: 7229

(F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)

*JD-1: 7231 (S. I. S. #25967).

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: Net
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)

Circular #2493 (In 2 parts, complete) Secret Separate message
 Policies:

In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.

Main points:

- (1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:
- (a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.

(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of both code and plain language telegrams will be prohibited. Short wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of embassies and legations, for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.

(2) Consular officials:

(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.

(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuations: The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.

(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan:

In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them.

(4) Publicly owned enemy property:

Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.

(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisitioning.

(6) While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchoukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.

25967

JD-1:

(F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: (Circular telegram)
 7 December 1941
 (Plain Japanese language using code names)
 Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

25856

JD-1: 7148

(M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: (Circular)
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following steps will be taken in China:

(1) British concessions—upon issuance of orders, the present force will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort will be made to accomplish this end through the instrumentality of existing set-ups.

(2) Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation compounds: Upon issuance of orders, our troops will take over these grounds, however, without exceeding their present strength they will make every effort to maintain order and avoid causing confusion.

Also this will be accomplished by the aid of the existing set-ups and their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies.

(3) Amoy settlement: The same procedure as the above will be employed.

(Part 2 not available)

JD-1: 7210
 25937

(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
 To: (Circular)
 7 December 1941
 (Purple)
 Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nanking government will not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain close relations and absolute cooperation with Japan.

(10) In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale and organization so that it may help alleviate Japan's burden in participating in a protracted world war.

(11) Steps will be taken to propagatate among the people through the cooperation of the Nanking Government, the true meaning of the present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order among the general public.

(12) Regarding economic plans in China, with a view to retaining and increasing mutual economic self-sufficiency, the emphasis will be

placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicitation of local capital and investments, increased production of commodities. For this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of.

NOTE.—Those departments in the above category which are connected with the Nanking Government will continue to maintain even closer contact with that government.

25937

JD-1: 7210

(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)

 [Secret]

From: Washington

To: Tokyo

7 December 1941

(Purple)

#1278

Re your #910.*

Your instructions and your #911** have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire.

Also we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka. (The HA code, O code, NE code, and the YO code).

Furthermore, the key of your #881***, first part, and your Circular #2400****, should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico are not safe it has not yet been sent.

Please be advised of the above.

26047

JD-1: 7299

(H) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (S-TT)

 *JD-1: 7147 S. I. S. 25854. Directs destruction of remaining cipher machine and machine codes.

**Not available.

***JD-1: 7101 S. I. S. 25754. Instructions for disposing of codes.

****JD-1: 7076 S. I. S. 25753. Re new keying method for cipher machine.

 [Secret]

From: Budapest

To: Tokyo

December 7, 1941

LA

#104

Re my #103.^a

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

Army 25866

JD 7184

Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

[Secret]

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 8, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#1437 Limited distribution

Re my #143(9?).^a

At 1:00 p. m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

Army 25978

Trans. 12/9/41

^a Not available.